In Russian historiography on the problem of belonging South Kuril Islands much attention was paid to the development of these lands by Russian pioneers, almost nothing was said about what contribution was made to this by the Japanese. Meanwhile, the topic seems to be extremely important for the speedy resolution of the territorial issue. In the Tokyo Declaration of 1993, the heads of the two countries agreed that the problem should be resolved on the basis of the principles of legality and justice, which implies its careful study not only from the side of international law, but also from the point of view of history.

Taking advantage of the weakening of Russian positions in the southern part of the Kuril Islands, Japanese fishermen first appear in Kunashir in 1799, and the next year on Iturup, where they destroy Russian crosses and illegally set up a pillar with a sign indicating that the islands belong to Japan. Japanese fishermen often began to arrive on the shores of South Sakhalin, fished, robbed the Ainu, which was the reason for frequent skirmishes between them. In 1805, Russian sailors from the frigate "Yunona" and the tender "Avos" on the shore of Aniva Bay set up a pillar with Russian flag, and the Japanese camp on Iturup was devastated. The Russians were warmly welcomed by the Ainu.

In 1854, in order to establish trade and diplomatic relations with Japan, the government of Nicholas I sent Vice Admiral E. Putyatin. His mission also included the delimitation of Russian and Japanese possessions. Russia demanded recognition of its rights to the island of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands, which had long belonged to it. Knowing perfectly well what a difficult situation Russia found itself in, waging a war with three powers in the Crimea [Crimean War] at the same time, Japan put forward unfounded claims to southern part Sakhalin. At the beginning of 1855, in the city of Shimoda, Putyatin signed the first Russian-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship, according to which Sakhalin was declared undivided between Russia and Japan, the border was established between the islands of Iturup and Urup, and the ports of Shimoda and Hakodate were opened for Russian ships and Nagasaki.

Shimodsky treatise of 1855 in article 2 defines: “From now on, the border between the Japanese state and Russia is to be established between the island of Iturup and the island of Urup. The entire island of Iturup belongs to Japan, the entire island of Urup and the Kuril Islands to the north of it belong to Russia. As for the island of Karafuto (Sakhalin), it is still not divided by the border between Japan and Russia.”

In our time, the Japanese side claims that this treaty comprehensively took into account the activities of Japan and Russia in the region of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands up to the time of its conclusion and was concluded as a result of negotiations between Japan and Russia in a peaceful atmosphere. The plenipotentiary representative of the Russian side at the talks, Admiral Putyatin, when signing the treaty, said: "In order to prevent future disputes, as a result of careful study, it was confirmed that Iturup Island is Japanese territory." Documents recently published in Russia show that Nicholas I considered Urup Island to be the southern limit of Russian territory.

The Japanese side considers erroneous the assertion that Japan imposed this treatise on Russia, which was in a difficult position during the Crimean War. It is completely contrary to the facts. At that time, Russia was one of the great European powers, while Japan was a small and weak country that the US, England and Russia forced to abandon the 300-year policy of self-isolation of the country.

Japan also considers erroneous the assertion that Russia allegedly has "historical rights" to the islands of Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and the Habomai ridge, confirmed by this treatise as a Japanese possession, by virtue of their discovery and expeditions. As mentioned above, both Nicholas I and Admiral E.V. Putyatin (1803 - 1883), on the basis of the then objective situation, concluded a treatise, realizing that the southern limit of Russia was the island of Urup, and Iturup and to the south of it were the territory of Japan. Beginning in 1855, for more than 90 years, neither Tsarist Russia nor the Soviet Union ever insisted on these so-called "historical rights."

There was no need for Japan to discover these islands, located at the shortest distance from her and visible from Hokkaido to the naked eye. On the map of the Shoho era, published in Japan in 1644, the names of the islands of Kunashir and Iturup are recorded. Japan ruled these islands before anyone else.

Actually, Japan substantiates its claims to the so-called "Northern Territories" precisely by the content of the Shimodsky treatise of 1855 and by the fact that until 1946 the Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan islands and the Habomai ridge were always the territories of Japan and never became the territories of Russia.

The government of Alexander II made the Middle East and Central Asia and, fearing to leave its relations with Japan uncertain in the event of a new aggravation of relations with England, went to the signing of the so-called Petersburg Treaty of 1875, according to which all the Kuril Islands, in exchange for the recognition of Sakhalin as Russian territory, passed to Japan. Alexander II, who had previously sold Alaska in 1867 for a symbolic and at that time amount of 11 million rubles, made a big mistake this time by underestimating the strategic importance of the Kuril Islands, which were later used by Japan for aggression against Russia. The tsar naively believed that Japan would become a peace-loving and calm neighbor of Russia, and when the Japanese, substantiating their claims, refer to the treaty of 1875, they for some reason forget (as G. Kunadze "forgot" today) about his first article: ".. ... and henceforth eternal peace and friendship will be established between the Russian and Japanese empires." Then there was 1904, when Japan treacherously attacked Russia... At the conclusion of the peace treaty in Portsmouth in 1905, the Japanese side demanded from Russia as an indemnity the island of Sakhalin. The Russian side then stated that this was contrary to the 1875 treaty. What did the Japanese say to this?

“The war crosses out all agreements, you have been defeated and let's proceed from the current situation. Only thanks to skillful diplomatic maneuvers did Russia manage to keep the northern part of Sakhalin for itself, and South Sakhalin went to Japan.

At the Yalta Conference of the Heads of Powers, the countries participating in the anti-Hitler coalition, held in February 1945, it was decided after the end of the Second World War that South Sakhalin and all the Kuril Islands be transferred to the Soviet Union, and this was the condition for the USSR to enter the war with Japan - three months after end of the war in Europe.

On September 8, 1951, 49 states signed a peace treaty with Japan in San Francisco. The draft treaty was prepared during the period " cold war"without the participation of the USSR and in violation of the principles of the Potsdam Declaration. The Soviet side proposed to demilitarize and ensure the democratization of the country. The representatives of the United States and Great Britain told our delegation that they had come here not to discuss, but to sign the treaty, and therefore not a single line should be changed The USSR, and with it Poland and Czechoslovakia, refused to put their signatures under the treaty. And interestingly, Article 2 of this treaty states that Japan renounces all rights and titles to Sakhalin Island and the Kuril Islands. Thus, Japan itself refused territorial claims to our country, backing it up with his signature.

At present, the Japanese side claims that the islands of Iturup, Shikotan, Kunashir and the Habomai ridge, which have always been Japanese territory, are not included in the Kuril Islands, which Japan abandoned. The US government, regarding the scope of the “Kuril Islands” concept in the San Francisco Peace Treaty, stated in an official document: “(They) do not include and there was no intention to include (in the Kuriles) the Habomai and Shikotan ridges, or Kunashir and Iturup, which previously have always been part of Japan proper and therefore must rightly be recognized as being under Japanese sovereignty."

1956, Soviet-Japanese negotiations on the normalization of relations between the two countries. The Soviet side agrees to cede the two islands of Shikotan and Habomai to Japan and offers to sign a peace treaty. The Japanese side is inclined to accept the Soviet proposal, but in September 1956 the United States sends a note to Japan stating that if Japan renounces its claims to Kunashir and Iturup and is satisfied with only two islands, then in this case the United States will not give up the Ryukyu Islands where the main island is Okinawa. American intervention played its part and... the Japanese refused to sign a peace treaty on our terms. The subsequent security treaty (1960) between the United States and Japan made it impossible for Japan to transfer Shikotan and Habomai. Our country, of course, could not give the islands to American bases, nor could it bind itself to any obligations to Japan on the issue of the Kuriles.

The history of relations between Russia and Japan in the twentieth century was not easy. Suffice it to recall that for a little over 40 years (1904-1945) Japan and Russia fought 4 times. In 1904-1905 in Manchuria, in 1918-1922 in Siberia and the Primorsky Territory, in 1939 on the Khalkhin-Gol River and Lake Khasan, and finally in 1945 in World War II. At present, the "territorial problem" continues to be persistently exploited by Japanese politicians with no less, but even greater intensity than before. True, now it, imperceptibly for a wide range of readers, has received a fishing, marine orientation. Such a vector was given to it by the summit meeting between the leaders of the two countries B. Yeltsin and R. Hashimoto.

It took place on November 1 and 2, 1997 in Krasnoyarsk. Then, as you know, Yeltsin and Hashimoto agreed to give impetus to negotiations on granting the right to fish to Japanese fishermen in the territorial sea of ​​Russia in the area of ​​the South Kuril Islands.

Moreover, the Japanese side insists on fishing precisely on those islands for which it has claimed: Khabomai, Shikotan, Kunashir and Iturup. In addition, the Japanese essentially demand that the Russian authorities provide them with the so-called “safe fishing”. Under this term lies the desire to fish in our waters without recognizing our fishing rules. And we must pay tribute to the Japanese - they will achieve this if the Agreement signed in 1998 between Russia and Japan on certain issues of cooperation in the field of harvesting marine living resources comes into force. In order for the latter to happen, it is necessary to additionally consider a number of technical issues on the fishery and obtain the approval of the Agreement by the Federal Assembly, as it concerns territorial sea Russia. It will not be easy for those who lobbied for this Agreement to achieve this, although the text of the Agreement itself includes only 7 articles and one appendix, which fits in just 5 typewritten pages.

Violation of Russian territorial waters in the South Kurils region by Japanese fishing vessels began at the height of the Cold War. The peak of these violations falls on the 70-80s and early 90s, when there were up to 8-10 thousand cases per year. In Soviet times, border guards were forbidden to open fire on Japanese violating ships. Border guards detained such ships. The captains were tried according to our laws, and they served prison sentences with us. In essence, these Japanese fishing captains were a kind of kamikaze. Our border guards came across, as a rule, Japanese slow-moving ships. The main part of the violators, having high-speed vessels, left with impunity. True Japanese professional fishermen call these special fishermen on high-speed vessels “yakuza”. Judging by their equipment and the presence of expensive marine engines, the main goal of the yakuza was not to fish and seafood, but to violate our territorial waters in order to maintain tension in the area, constantly declaring Japan's territorial claims to Russia. The situation with Japanese violators has changed dramatically since 1994-1995, when new Russia decided to defend its national interests in the area of ​​the South Kuriles using weapons to stop high-speed violating ships. Not without, unfortunately, and without wounding the Japanese. The ardor of violators began to cool down, and the violations of our territorial waters themselves were reduced from 10 thousand to 12-15 cases per year.

In order to maintain tension over the territorial issue, Japanese strategists put forward claims to the Russian side regarding the provision of so-called safe fishing for Japanese fishermen in the waters adjacent to those territories that Japan claimed, that is, near the South Kuriles. At that time, the followers of Kozyrev's conciliatory diplomacy, instead of rejecting such absurd claims and starting negotiations on economic cooperation in the field of fisheries between the two countries, as representatives of the fishing industry suggested, conducted negotiations according to the Japanese scenario. In order to break down the negative attitude towards such negotiations on the part of our fishermen, a massive discrediting of the fishing industry among our public was carried out, I believe, not without the help of the Japanese special services, with extensive use of the press. What are the fictions about the fishing mafia and a number of tendentious speeches on this issue in both the radical and leftist press worth? All these soap bubbles, unfortunately, gave their negative results.

For the first time, Hokkaido fishermen were allowed to fish for seaweed off Signalny Island in the early 1960s. On this issue, an interdepartmental (I draw the attention of readers not intergovernmental) Agreement was quickly and without delay concluded, according to which “Japanese fishermen engaged in fishing for seaweed ... must comply with the laws, regulations and rules of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in force in this area, including the rules governing seaweed fishing”. This key provision, which has been in force for more than 30 years, has disappeared from the text of the new Agreement. Completely inexplicable surrender of our positions. It turns out that it has become profitable for someone to weaken Russia's position regarding its sovereignty in its territorial sea near the southern Kuriles. Let me suggest that it was precisely for this reason that such multi-round negotiations (13 rounds over 3 years) were started to develop a new Agreement, in which there was no place not only to protect the national fishing interests of Russia, but also its sovereignty in the territorial sea.

In addition, based on the provisions of the articles of the Agreement, the Russian side for the first time took an unprecedented step, as a result of which Japanese fishermen will essentially fish in Russian territorial waters near the four islands of the southern Kuriles. Near those same islands - Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashir and Iturup - to which Japan claims. At the same time, Japan not only does not grant similar rights to Russian fishing vessels to fish in Japanese territorial waters, for example, off the island of Hokkaido, but also has not undertaken any obligations for its citizens and vessels to comply with the laws and regulations of fishing in our waters. Moreover, in the text of the Agreement itself there is no mention of measures to control the Japanese fishery by the Russian fishery and border service authorities. In addition, the fishing area itself, located in our territorial sea, received an unnamed name under the Agreement - “Sea area”. Apparently, the authors of this innovation believe that it is located far, far beyond the territory of our country. It turns out that Russia, under this Agreement, renounces its sovereignty in its own territorial sea in the South Kuriles region (indeed, another, however, now without a single shot from the Japanese side, the territorial Pearl Harbor for the novice politician Boris Nemtsov, who left his autograph on such an ambiguous document). Probably, the developers of this Agreement, realizing its vulnerability to criticism, decided to time its signing at the deadliest time for the political elite and observers - on Saturday, and its text itself still does not reach the general Russian public.

It is also interesting that almost simultaneously with the signing of the Agreement, it was announced that Japan would provide Russia with an unrelated loan of $1.5 billion "for the development of reforms." Isn't this a payment for the Agreement that is detrimental to Russia? In addition, it is planned to direct part of these funds to the construction of housing for military personnel.

During the negotiations on the development of the Agreement, the Japanese side had an undoubted advantage over the Russian side in the main issue - the clarity of its position. The Japanese openly declared and defended by all means available to them their territorial claims to the islands of Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and Habomai. One may disagree with such an approach, but it is precisely the openness and clarity of Japan's principled approach on this issue that does it honor, and it has always remained unchanged. Japan did not solve fishing problems in the course of negotiations on the Agreement, but sought and achieved a strengthening of its position on territorial claims.

It is more difficult to understand Russia's position on this fundamental issue. We seem to recognize the existence of a territorial problem and at the same time we can not decide what we are going to defend. All this creates a kind of vacuum in our position, which is filled with improvisation by various officials from various departments participating in negotiations with Japan. Hence the precariousness of our positions, the vagueness of the main goal - whether to solve fishing problems, or to please temporary politicians?

As for cooperation between the two countries in the field of fisheries, it is really necessary for both our and Japanese fishermen. Such cooperation in the conditions of market relations has a complex character, since competition for resources is intertwined with the need to preserve them, and at the same time with competition for sales markets. Therefore, fishing relations between Russia and Japan should be based on an equal and mutually beneficial basis, without any connection to the so-called territorial problem.

To be sure, Tokyo's position on Russia has undergone some changes. She abandoned the principle of "inseparability of politics and economics", that is, the rigid linkage of the territorial problem with cooperation in the field of the economy, including fisheries. Now the Japanese government is trying to pursue a flexible policy, which means gently promoting economic cooperation and solving the territorial problem at the same time. In words, it seems like a change, but in practice, pressure and pressure again. As before, only in fishing there are such restrictions for Russian fishing vessels as calling at ports, import quotas for a number of fishing objects, closing of fishing areas, which does not even allow us to choose the quota allocated to our vessels in the 200-mile zone of Japan; there are difficulties in creating mixed enterprises in Japan, and so on. True, it is still quite difficult for Japanese entrepreneurs to do business here in Russia. All this hinders fishing cooperation, and most importantly, does not create sustainable trust between business people. In general, in my opinion, the Japanese image of Russia as a potential adversary should change, just as we have the Russian image of Japan as a constant aggressor in the past to the image of neighboring countries that can cooperate mutually beneficially. As a key link in such a development of cooperation, one should choose fisheries, fisheries of the two countries, including in the area of ​​the Kuril Islands. Of course, as the experience of the past has shown, it is not easy to do this, especially in a short time. But we must try to realize this chance, and not invent non-existent problems of safe fishing. Much here depends on the Japanese side, on its lifting of all restrictions on such cooperation, including the removal of political demands on the territorial problem from this direction. After all, Japan managed to embark on such a path with China and even concluded a peace treaty, although the problems of ownership of the Senkaku (Diaoyudai) Islands have not been resolved. Close analogy with the Kuriles.

On November 9, 2006, the Sakhalin Regional Duma adopted a resolution "On the ongoing cartographic aggression of Japan against Russian Federation". It states that, contrary to bilateral and multilateral agreements, in the conditions of the Cold War, Japan, since 1969, began compiling and disseminating political maps, on which the image of the territory of Russia is distorted: the Kuril Islands south of Urup Island began to be designated as the territory of Japan, the national cartographic department systematically includes the area of ​​the islands of the Lesser Kuril Ridge, as well as Kunashir and Iturup, in the total area of ​​Japan. The revision of political maps was followed by a revision of physical geography - the named islands on Japanese maps disappeared from the Kuril archipelago

The only key to mutual understanding between the two countries is the creation of a climate of trust, trust and again trust, as well as broad mutually beneficial cooperation in various fields of politics, economics and culture. To reduce the distrust accumulated over the centuries to zero and start moving towards trust with a plus is the key to the success of a peaceful neighborhood and tranquility in the border maritime regions of Russia and Japan. Will current politicians be able to realize this opportunity? Will show time.

So our two-week trip to the Kuril Islands has come to an end. We visited the island of Iturup and saw the islands of Kunashir and Shikotan.

To say that this trip left a lot of impressions about me is to say nothing. There are so many emotions from what he saw, learned, that their number cannot be counted. The memory card stores hundreds of photos, and the mind wants to scream with joy: "We did it!".

Why the Kuriles? I wanted to visit these islands for a long time. I was attracted here by the beauty of nature I saw from photographs and video reports, as well as the opportunity to walk a lot, enjoying the clean air. Yes, and some kind of internal inconsistency was undermining that I visited many places in Russia, but I never saw what is nearby and where hundreds of tourists rush every year. In addition, my husband served in the army on Iturup, and after several years he worked on a geological research expedition on the famous Baransky volcano. Therefore, stories about how beautiful and unique this island is, we heard quite often in our family.

For three years we were going to go, but the birth of a second child stopped, and then the desire to bring small children to the bright sun, which was lacking in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk for a year, and in the Kuriles the weather is as unstable as ours. But this year we firmly decided that if we postpone the trip again, we will never do it. And let's go. Four of us, with two children. Few knew about our plans, but not because we are superstitious, but because those to whom we told about the plans for this summer began to twist their fingers to their temples and all as one lamented: "With children? Crazy! Bears will eat you! You will freeze and get sick! You will quickly get bored there! But what is there to see! ". In response to all these exclamations, today I want to answer that we are alive and well, had a great rest and even sunbathed, and there is something to look at the Kuril Islands and this list is endless, since their main attraction is nature, and it is different every day.

Although the Kuriles and the islands of the Sakhalin region, a significant part of the journey to them is the road. Unless, of course, you choose not an airplane, but a ship as a means of transportation. We chose the second. Today I want to talk about the features of this part of the journey.

Why ship? Firstly, because the price of ferry tickets is much cheaper than plane tickets. Thus, in June, the price of a ticket for the Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk - Kurilsk plane was 7,300 rubles per person for residents of the Sakhalin Region and 15,000 for residents of other regions of Russia and foreigners. Tickets are bought for everyone, including for children from 2 years old (as on standard Russian flights). The price of tickets for the ship "Igor Farkhutdinov" Korsakov-Kurilsk-Yuzhno-Kurilsk-Malokurilsk-Korsakov for June-July 2017:

• 4x local cabins without amenities (shower, toilet in the common corridor) - 3727 rubles per person.
• 2x-4x local cabins with private facilities - 5587 rubles per person.
• 2-bed suite (shower, toilet, sofa, TV in the cabin) - 9307 rubles.

In addition, children under five years old travel free of charge without providing a separate seat, from five to seven years old, children buy a ticket at the price of half an adult. Attention! Those who are going to travel with a small child under five in this way, take with you a printout of the rules from the site or from the tour operator that the child must travel for free. On the way back, they began to demand money from us for the child, it was the possession of this information that helped put everything in its place, and the daughter drove for free (I will indicate the website and the city address below).

Additional fees are paid: Korsakov - 550 rubles, Kunashir - 150 rubles, Iturup - 150 rubles.

Bed linen is also paid - 180 rubles per set.

Also, there are no restrictions on the weight of luggage on the ship. You don't have to pay for luggage. Therefore, tourists with huge backpacks, as a rule, choose the way by sea.

Where to buy tickets? Most convenient way use the site federal system rfbus.ru bus ticket offices, where to buy it is enough to enter the date of departure and your passport data, select a cabin and pay for the ticket with a card. The second way is to buy from a manager. The sales office is located at: 21 Kommunistichesky Prospekt, 3rd floor, Opera restaurant building.

Purchase feature. Tickets can only be purchased one month before departure or later, subject to availability. That is, if you, for example, are going to go on July 18, then you can buy a ticket from June 18. Previously not possible. The same system applies to the return ticket. For the people of Sakhalin return tickets are purchased only on Sakhalin or on the website, in the Kuril Islands at the port ticket office you will not be able to buy them.

Border zone. The Kuriles are a border zone. Therefore, for everyone who does not have a Kuril residence permit, as well as those who do not go there for conscription service and work on the call of an enterprise, it is necessary to obtain an entry permit. Without it, you will be allowed to go even to the ladder. Without permission, you can simply ride on the sea on a ship without going to land. Permission must be obtained in Kholmsk in border service, since the ship's home port is the city of Kholmsk. Be sure to print e-tickets They are stamped with obligatory stamps. Permission to enter can be obtained by one person after another with the presence of their passports. But for children, only one of the parents or legal representative should receive permission. Grandmother, grandfather, aunt, uncle and other relatives and friends will not be given it.

Departure . The ship departs from the port of Korsakov, boarding starts at 10 am. According to the rules, passengers need to arrive at the port in advance. But here the phrase "from 10 am" plays an important role. No one can assure you that due to bad weather and other circumstances you will not board the ship much later. We were told by experienced tourists that they lived in Korsakov waiting for boarding for five days. But this, as a rule, happens in autumn and at the very beginning of winter, when storms are frequent.

We were lucky: we waited in the port for only an hour, and went to check-in at 11 am. Now a bus takes passengers to the ship, it is free.

Travel time. Travel time from Korsakov to the port of the village of Kitovy (Iturup Island) is 19 hours, you have to spend the night in a cabin. In good weather, arrive the next morning.

Nutrition. I recommend taking food with you, because on this ship the ticket price does not include food (unlike the ferries that run from Kholmsk to Vanino). Of course, there is a restaurant on board, but the prices are hellish, and the choice of food is poor: only complex breakfasts, lunches, and dinners from the Sanes company from Kholmsk are offered. There is no cook on board. So a plate of semolina porridge with tea (breakfast) cost - 260 rubles, pasta with sausage and seaweed soup and dried fruit compote (dinner) - 460 rubles. There is also a bar. There prices are even higher. The cheapest kuksa cost 100 rubles. The benefit of boiling water is unlimited and free.

You can go out on the open decks, which we actually did most of the time until it started to get dark.

Pictured is the port of Korsakov.

Having gone out into the open sea, they looked for jellyfish and looked at the waves.

Well, in the evening they read, chatted, children drew.

On this journey, we were very lucky with fellow travelers. On the way to Iturup, Ivan lived with us in a cabin - a very interesting man, whose mother is Russian, and whose father is Chinese, he spent part of his childhood in Beijing. And when he grew up, he decided that choosing one profession was for wimps. Every two or three years he changes his field of activity and place of residence. He worked as a freelance artist in the Crimea for two years, he tamed wild mustangs in the Russian steppes, worked as an au pair in distant villages, and even lived with monks in Tibet. This time he went to work in Kurilsk, wanting to see this nature with his own eyes. It was very interesting to communicate with him.

Our ship arrived at the port of Kitovy village on Iturup in the morning of the next day. It's amazing when, awakened by a flight attendant, you look out the window and see the island in the morning mist.

Here you can see the volcano Chirip.

Happy went ashore. The weather that day was better than Sakhalin these days. The degree was approaching thirty, and we arrived from the winter quarters.

Have you been met anywhere with bread and salt?

We lived here in the village, which is located about two kilometers from the administrative center - the city of Kurilsk.

Enthusiasm, reinforced by a thirst for impressions, made me drop my backpacks, change clothes and go in search of adventure...

If your path lies on the Kuril Islands, Iturup Island, of course, should be part of your trip. After all, this is a very beautiful and original place. No wonder many consider it a real pearl of the Kuriles. We offer today to find out what the island of Iturup is, find out where it is located, what is the climate here and what are the features of flora and fauna. We will also figure out how you can get to this interesting place.

Iturup Island: photo, description

Iturup is the largest Great Kuril chain, which is part of the Kuril Islands, located in the Pacific Ocean. Iturup belongs to the Russian Federation, but Japan has been claiming its rights to it for a long time. The authorities of this country consider it as the prefecture of Hokkaido. As for the name of the island, it is believed that it comes from the word "etorop", which can be translated from the Ainu language as "jellyfish".

Geography and map of Iturup Island

As already mentioned, this island is located in the Pacific Ocean. On the north side, it is washed by the waters. Iturup Island on the map of Russia can be found in the southeast of our big country. The map clearly shows how close Iturup is to Japan.

The length of the island from northeast to southwest is 200 kilometers, and its width is different parts varies from seven to twenty-seven kilometers. The area of ​​Iturup is 3200 square kilometers. The island consists of mountain ranges and volcanic massifs. There are about twenty volcanoes here, nine of which are active (Curly, Lesser Brother, Chirip, and others). In addition, such a seemingly small island of Iturup boasts many picturesque waterfalls, including Russia - Ilya Muromets (141 meters). In addition, there are lakes, as well as hot and mineral springs.

Flora

Iturup Island is rich not only in volcanoes, waterfalls and geysers, but also in a number of representatives flora. So, most of its territory is covered with coniferous forests, consisting of small-seeded spruces and Sakhalin firs. AT central area islands you can see the Kuril larch. In the southern part of Iturup, broad-leaved species also grow: thin-curly oak, calopanax, maple. Also on the island are very developed thickets of bamboo - Kuril saz, which makes the slopes of the mountains and forests almost impassable.

Climate

Iturup Island has a moderate summer here is humid and quite cool. The warmest month is August, when the average daily temperature reaches +14 degrees Celsius. Therefore, when going to Iturup, be sure to bring warm clothes even in summer. As for winter, it is much milder here than on the continent, and is characterized by frequent snowfalls followed by thaws. average temperature in the coldest month - February - is -3 degrees Celsius.

Inhabitants of the island and settlements

About six and a half thousand people live on Iturup today. In the central region of the island on the coast Sea of ​​Okhotsk the only city and administrative center here is Kurilsk. Its population is about 1800 people. The rest of the islanders live in the rural settlements of Kitovoe, Reidovo, Rybaki, Goryachiye Klyuchi and a number of others.

Minerals

In 1992, the world's only economically viable rhenium deposit was discovered on Iturup Island. It is located on the Kudryavy volcano. According to scientists, about twenty tons of rhenium are ejected from the depths of the volcano to the surface every year. Interestingly, the world production of this metal per year does not exceed forty tons. One kilogram of rhenium costs about 10 thousand US dollars. This metal is strategically valuable, as it is used by enterprises of the military-industrial complex (primarily in the aerospace field). In addition to rhenium, the bowels of Iturup are rich in bismuth, indium, germanium, gold, silver, and selenium. There is also a large deposit of native sulfur.

How to get to Iturup

Air communication of the island is carried out through the Burevestnik airfield located here, which belongs to Russian Ministry defense. Passenger and cargo sea communication is carried out with the help of two motor ships: "Polaris" and "Igor Farkhutdinov".

I would like to note that if you decide to visit the Iturup Island, then most likely you will have to go by plane. Canadians fly here aircraft Bombardier DHC-8. For example, a ticket from the city of Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk will cost you four and a half thousand rubles. Travel time is about an hour. Moreover, keep in mind that the plane does not always depart on schedule. This is due to the variability of weather conditions on Iturup. It even happens that people who want to get to the island wait two or even three days for flying weather.

Arriving at Burevestnik, you will most likely be very surprised. After all, luggage here (without tags) will be unloaded from the plane directly to the ground, where each passenger must pick up their things. As for the airfield itself, it is located about 60 kilometers from Kurilsk. Moreover, you will drive 50 kilometers along a dirt road, and another 10 along the shore of Kasatka Bay (which can only be done at low tide). This is due to the fact that the airfield was built by the Japanese. It was from here that their fighters were sent to bomb Pearl Harbor. A new airport is under construction not far from Kurilsk.

Russian military aircraft will be based on Iturup Island in the Kuril chain along with civil aviation, the corresponding order has already been signed by Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev. Iturup Island is one of the four southern Kuril Islands, whose ownership is being challenged by Japan.

Russian military aviation will be based at the airport on the Kuril island of Iturup along with a civilian one. The corresponding permission was signed by the head of the government of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev, it is published on the official Internet portal of legal information.

"Section "Sakhalin Region" of the list of airfields of joint basing of the Russian Federation<…>, supplement with the position of the following content: “Iturup is a civilian of the Russian Ministry of Defense,” the Prime Minister’s order says.

In October 2017, Frants Klintsevich, Deputy Chairman of the Committee on Defense and Security of the Federation Council, announced the construction of a naval base on Kuril Islands.

"Decision is made. It is under implementation,” said Klintsevich. At the same time, the senator did not specify on which island the Russian military base would be located.

It's probably Kurilian. Matua island– back in May 2016 about the possibility of building there Russian base wrote the media, citing a source in military-diplomatic circles. Then information also appeared that the land part or the basing point for ships of the near sea zone could be located on the island.

The Russian machine-gun and artillery division of the Eastern Military District is based on the Kuril Islands. In November 2016, Russia deployed Bastion and Bal coastal missile systems on the Kuril Islands, Iturup and Kunashir.

As early as 2015, the personnel of the Bal coastal missile division began preparing for firing practice in the Sea of ​​Japan. In addition, in 2015, Tor-M2U anti-aircraft missile systems were put on combat duty at Iturup and Kunashir.

Commenting on the deployment of missiles on the Kuril Islands, the Kremlin expressed the opinion that this step should not affect the state of Russian-Japanese relations. “Of course, this [the deployment of missiles] has its rationale. At the same time, from our point of view, this should not in any way affect the centripetal tendencies that are now in our bilateral relations with Tokyo, ”said Dmitry Peskov, then press secretary of the President of the Russian Federation.

At the end of January, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe spoke about the great potential of Russian-Japanese relations, touching upon and Kuril question. “We will deepen Japanese-Russian ties by further advancing the eight-pronged cooperation plan, joint economic activity on the four northern islands<...>Having solved the territorial issue, we will conclude a peace treaty with Russia,” Abe said.

Recall that Japan claims its rights to the southern islands of the Kuril chain, in particular, Kunashir, Shikotan, Iturup and Khabomai.

Tokyo substantiates its claims with the bilateral Treatise on Trade and Borders, signed in 1855. The recognition of these islands as Japanese territory is a condition for concluding a peace treaty with Russia - after World War II, this document was never signed.

In 1956, the USSR and Japan signed a Joint Declaration, according to which Moscow undertook to consider the possibility of transferring the islands of Habomai and Shikotan to the Japanese. However, Tokyo took this step as part of the solution to the problem and did not give up its claims to the other two islands.

The Russian side has repeatedly stated that the issue of ownership of the southern Kuril Islands is closed and Russian sovereignty over these territories is not subject to discussion.

The fundamental position of the Russian Federation is that the islands of the Kuril chain became part of the USSR (of which Russia became the successor) following the results of the Second World War.

Practical value southern islands The Kuril ridge is explained by the richness of the sea surrounding them with biological resources, in addition, the possession of the islands automatically means the possession of an exclusive economic zone - and this is tens of thousands of square miles of ocean. In addition, the straits of the South Kuril Islands provide Russian ships with access to the open ocean.

The ridge of the Kuril Islands extends for 640 miles from the southern tip of Kamchatka to the island of Hokkaido. It consists of 30 large and many small islands and rocks. Most major islands- Iturup, Urup, _ Kunashir (in the south) and Paramushir (in the north).

Most of them are mountainous, covered with dense thickets of bamboo and reeds, which are occasionally cut by dirt and country roads. Communication between the islands, separated by deep-water straits, was supported by fishing vessels. Frequent fogs, numerous reefs and rocks, a limited number of anchorages, strong currents in the straits, reaching 5-7 knots, make it difficult to navigate in the coastal waters of the Kuril ridge.

The shores of the islands are mostly rocky, steep, often turning into sheer walls. high altitude. There are few harbors and bays suitable for basing and mooring ships.

Profitable geographical position the Kuril Islands allowed the Japanese imperialists to control the exit Soviet ships into the ocean and create here a springboard for aggression against the USSR. By August 1945 on Kuril ridge 9 airfields were equipped, 6 of them on the islands of Shumshu and Paramushir - in the immediate vicinity of Kamchatka. Up to 600 aircraft could be based on these airfields.

Shumshu Island

The most fortified in the Kuril ridge was Shumshu Island, separated from Kamchatka by the First Kuril Strait, 6.5 miles wide. This island, measuring 20 by 13 kilometers, was considered by the Japanese as a springboard for the conquest of Soviet Kamchatka. In its southeastern part, the well-equipped naval base of Kataoka was located, and 3 miles from it on the island of Paramushir was the naval base of Kashiwabara. Before the war, light forces were based here. Two airfields on Shumshu Island could base up to two air regiments. In addition, a base for hydroaviation was equipped on Lake Bettobu.

All sections of the coast available for landing were covered by pillboxes and bunkers.

They were connected underground passages and trenches, which were used not only for maneuvering forces and means, but also as shelters for various warehouses, power plants, communication centers, hospitals and other facilities. The depth of underground structures, reaching 50 meters, ensured their invulnerability from artillery shells and bombs. The main line of defense of Shumshu Island took place in its northeastern part, in the region of heights 171 and 165.

In the event of the landing of sections of the coast, the Japanese could secretly withdraw from this line into the depths of the island. The Shumshu garrison consisted of the 73rd brigade of the 92nd infantry division, the 31st air defense regiment, the Kuril fortress artillery regiment, and a subdivision of the 11th tank regiment (60 tanks) - a total of 8,500 people. Due to the transfer of troops from Paramushir Island, it could be increased to 23 thousand people. The total length of roads on the island of Shumshu reached 120 kilometers, which provided the enemy with the possibility of a wide maneuver of troops inside the island.

Thus, the island of Shumshu and the north-eastern part of the island of Paramushir were a strong anti-landing fortified area.

The troops of the Kamchatka defensive region consisted of the 101st Rifle Division, separate units and subunits scattered along the entire coast of the peninsula. They were covered by the 128th mixed air division, numbering 42 aircraft. In Petropavlovsk there were about 30 ships, mostly small ones.

On August 15, the Kamchatka defensive area (commanded by Major General A. R. Gnechko) and the Petropavlovsk naval base (commander Captain 1st Rank D. G. Ponomarev) were tasked with capturing the islands of Shumshu and Paramushir and, subsequently, the island of Onekotan. Major General A. R. Gnechko was appointed commander of the landing operation, captain 1st rank D. G. Ponomarev was appointed commander of the landing, and Major General P. I. Dyakov, commander of the 101st Infantry Division, was appointed commander of the landing.

A.R. Gnechko

D.G. Ponomarev P.I. Dyakov

Major General Gnechko decided to land troops in the northeastern part of Shumshu Island (Cape Kokutan, Cape Kotomari), deliver the main blow in the direction of the Kataoka naval base, capture the island and, using it as a springboard, subsequently capture the Paramushir and Onekotan islands. In order to mislead the enemy about the place of landing of the main forces, it was supposed to land a demonstrative landing in Nanagawa-wan Bay. To implement this plan, units of the 101st Rifle Division and a naval infantry battalion formed from units of the naval base were consolidated into a forward detachment, two echelons of the main forces and a demonstrative landing detachment.

The landing ship consisted of 64 units, including 2 patrol ships, a minelayer, 4 minesweepers, 17 transport and 16 special landing craft.

Detachments of ships were formed to deliver the landing force to the island of Shumshu and ensure its operations.

The detachment of transports and landing craft, commanded by Captain 2nd Rank G.V. Bogorodsky, included the mother ship "Sever", the hydrographic vessels "Polyarny" and "Swan", the transports "Pugachev", "Chapaev", "Kokkinaki", "Uritsky ”, “Menzhinsky”, “Turkmen”, “Petrel”, “Far East”, “Red Banner”, “Moskalvo”, refrigerator No. 2, “General Panfilov”, “Maxim Gorky” and “Volkhov”, 16 landing craft, two self-propelled barges and four Kawasaki boats.

The security detachment, headed by the captain of the 3rd rank Skiba, consisted of eight patrol boats of the MO-4 type.

The trawling detachment (commander Lieutenant Commander P.P. Oleinik) included the minesweepers Vekha, TShch-155, TShch-156 and TShch-525.

patrol ship "Kirov"

Patrol ships "Kirov" and "Dzerzhinsky", the minelayer "Okhotsk" constituted an artillery support detachment (commander captain 3rd rank I. D. Sizov). In addition to this detachment, the landing force was supposed to be supported by a battery at Cape Lopatka, the 128th mixed air division and six MBR-2 base aircraft.

An extremely limited time was allotted for the preparation of the operation - about a day. Nevertheless, the headquarters of the Kamchatka defensive region and the Petropavlovsk naval garrison managed not only to ensure the regrouping and concentration of troops scattered along the coast, but also to develop, reproduce and bring to the executors the most important combat documents - combat and organizational orders, a planned table of interaction, an order for the passage of ships by sea, instructions to commanders of ships and captains of transports to cross by sea, according to the disposition in the landing area, on the battle for landing, the use of communications and naval artillery.

Due to lack of time, special training of landing units and ship personnel was excluded. Under these conditions, the command Special attention devoted to the organization of firm and continuous control of forces, the coordination of the actions of troops, ships and aircraft, as well as the provision of combat operations. The fact that the commander of the Kamchatka defensive region managed the forces assigned to participate in the Kuril landing operation through the operational headquarters, created from representatives of the headquarters of the defensive region, the naval base and the 128th air division, made it possible to purposefully and promptly resolve all issues related to preparation and conduct of hostilities.

To organize party-political work among the personnel of the landing force at the sea crossing and during the landing battle, an operational group was created headed by the head of the political department of the Petropavlovsk naval base, Colonel P. I. Smirnov.

The command and the political department of the base paid special attention to the preparation of the marine battalion, which was to be the first to land on the unequipped coast of the Kuriles. The battalion was headed by an experienced officer, a participant in the Great Patriotic War, Major T. A. Pochtarev. Major A.P. Perm, senior instructor of the political department of the base, was appointed his deputy for political affairs, and senior lieutenant V.N. Bykasov was appointed party organizer. Of the 783 people who made up the battalion, 493 were communists and Komsomol members.

On the sea crossing, in order to conceal the landing force, it was planned to use only means of visual communication and radio on VHF, and during the battle for landing and actions on the coast - radio.

At the direction of Major General A. R. Gnechko, two command posts were being prepared - at Cape Lopatka and on the minesweeper "TShch-334".

Our troops, ships and aviation did not experience a shortage of material and technical means, their stocks significantly exceeded the probable needs associated with hostilities. More difficult, given the lack of time and transport, was the delivery of military equipment to the places of basing and deployment of ships, aircraft and ground units. However, this difficulty was overcome thanks to the well-coordinated and selfless work of the rear services, which were greatly assisted by the party and public organizations of Petropavlovsk, which mobilized all their vehicles for military transportation.

Navigational and hydrographic support for the landing was entrusted to the navigational combat units of the ships and specially formed hydrographic groups. Military pilots who had experience in guiding ships through the First Kuril Strait were also involved in the operation. Ship commanders and ship captains received a description of approaches from the sea to Shumshu Island and a map of routes from the deployment area to the landing sites of landing units. The advance detachment of the landing included hydrographic parties, which were to make reconnaissance measurements of the coastal front of the landing, install fencing facilities on the water and on the coast, and thereby ensure the safe approach of ships to the coast.

The landing on the ships ended by the end of 16 August. In total, 8363 people, 95 guns, 123 mortars and other military equipment and equipment were taken on board. At 5 o'clock on August 17, the ships weighed anchor, lined up in a marching order and left Avacha Bay for the ocean with the expectation of approaching Shumshu Island in the morning of the next day. Most of the way they had to follow in the fog. Poor visibility caused significant difficulties in managing a large number of ships, but favored the secrecy of the operation.

At the crossing, commanders and political workers told the paratroopers about the situation on the Soviet-Japanese front, and explained the features of the upcoming landing.

Late at night, in fog, the ships approached the First Kuril Strait. Only occasionally the silence of the night was broken by the firing of an artillery battery from Cape Lopatka. For the fourth day already, this battery (commander Senior Lieutenant S. I. Sokolyuk) periodically fired at the Japanese fortifications on Shumshu Island, so it could not prevent the suddenness of the landing.

The commander of the operation, due to the difficult meteorological situation, transferred his command post to the minesweeper "TShch-334". He canceled the landing of a demonstrative landing in Nanagawa-wan Bay, fearing that ships could run into coastal rocks in continuous fog.

In difficult conditions of a long passage, the crews of the ships of the Pacific Fleet demonstrated high seamanship, excellent navigational training, ensuring an accurate landing in the deployment area. The general favorable situation on the eve of Japan's surrender also contributed to the success of the transition. In addition, the Japanese command Kuril group, as it turned out later from a survey of prisoners, knowing that we had limited forces in Kamchatka, considered it impossible for Soviet troops to land on the islands in the near future.

At 4 o'clock 20 min. On August 18, the ships approached Shumshu and on the Cape Kokutai - Cape Kotomari section, under cover of fog (visibility did not exceed 100 m), began landing the first assault, consisting of a battalion of marines (without one company), a company of submachine gunners and a mortar company, platoons of chemists and scouts of the 302nd rifle regiment and one company of the 119th separate engineer battalion. due to overload and big draft the ships stopped 100-150 meters from the coast, and the paratroopers threw themselves into the water along the ladders and over the side and, with a heavy burden behind them, rushed to the enemy coast.

Among the first to land on the shore was the commander of a platoon of submachine gunners, communist foreman A.P. Belov, Komsomol organizer of the marine battalion, communist senior sergeant G.P. Pankratov, squad leader, communist sergeant G.V. Kulemin, Komsomol members, junior sergeant I.G. M. Ya. Nesterov and other sailors.

Stunned by the sudden appearance of paratroopers on the shore, the Japanese opened indiscriminate rifle and machine-gun fire. The advance detachment of the landing force landed on the shore by 5 o'clock in full strength and without loss. Its main forces under the command of Major P. I. Shutov began to move inland, and one company of marines, led by Major T. A. Pochtarev, launched an offensive in the area of ​​​​Cape Kotomari in order to destroy the artillery batteries located here. The hydrographers and spotters who landed with the forward detachment ensured the approach of the ships to the landing sites and the accurate firing of naval artillery.

The enemy, having come to his senses, began to actively resist. At 5 o'clock. 30 minutes, when ships with the main forces of the landing force headed for the shore, Japanese pillboxes and bunkers met them with heavy fire. Batteries from Capes Kokutan and Kotomari and from the tanker "Mariupol" fired especially effectively, shooting at the entire coastal landing area. Our ships of the artillery support detachment and the coastal battery from Cape Lopatka concentrated all the fire on them. With the very first volleys, they destroyed a battery on the Mariupol tanker, which was clearly visible from the sea. Shooting at the batteries on Capes Kokutan and Kotomari proved to be ineffective: they were hidden here in deep caponiers.

The Japanese had large stocks of shells. As soon as the main landing forces approached the shore, a flurry of artillery fire fell upon them.

From a direct hit by enemy shells, two landing craft caught fire, three others received from 5 to 10 holes. Several ships, due to damage to the control mechanisms, became a fixed target for Japanese gunners. Ammunition began to explode on the damaged ships. The paratroopers got to the shore by swimming through the water boiling from shells. The crews of the ships, without weakening the fire on the enemy, put out the fires, sealed up the holes.

Having landed the unit of the first throw, the crew of landing craft No. 1 took another group of fighters from the transport and again headed for the shore. This time the ship had to overcome a zone of dense artillery fire. Almost simultaneously, four enemy shells exploded on it. There was a fire, there were wounded. The crew calmly fought for the survivability of the ship. Lieutenant I. I. Permyakov, who was in charge of extinguishing the fire, having discovered that the fire was approaching the shells, rushed to the fire hose, but he was killed. Then the lieutenant, without hesitation, shielded the shells with his body and, despite the burns, rolled them out of the dangerous place.

On landing craft No. 2, a strong fire also broke out from a direct hit by enemy shells. Part of the team died, and the survivors could not cope with the fire. The minelayer Okhotsk, commanded by Lieutenant Commander V.K. Moiseenko, hastened to help the ship. Thanks to the selfless actions of the commander of the electromechanical warhead, senior engineer-lieutenant V. A. Mandor, chief boatswain midshipman Vasiliev, sailors Kolesnikov, Korobin and other crew members, the fire was extinguished.

Landing craft No. 43 was thrown ashore, which received heavy damage and caught fire. The Japanese, noticing that they were continuing to extinguish the fire on the ship, opened fire on it from a bunker. Sailor Androshchuk returned fire with tracer bullets, thus marking the target location for artillery support ships. Soon the Japanese bunker was destroyed. The surviving members of the crew desperately fought the fire, the danger from which became threatening. It was difficult to operate in the caustic and hot air, clothes caught fire, but the sailors persistently put out the flames with water, fire extinguishers and asbestos mats. With incredible difficulty, the fire was extinguished.

On landing ship No. 8, commanded by Senior Lieutenant I. D. Yastrub, the main machine, there was a fire. Many crew members were injured, but remained in service in order to land paratroopers as quickly as possible.

Simultaneously with the units of the first throw, hydrographers and spotters were landed. Their task was to ensure an accurate approach to the coast of ships and vessels with the main forces of the landing force and to organize the adjustment of artillery fire on coastal targets.

Hydrographers were able to establish two light landmarks that were of great help to the ships. The correctors failed. They landed with the equipment directly into the water. Therefore, all their radio stations were out of order. Of the 22 radio stations delivered by the paratroopers to the shore, only the equipment of the corps of the Dzerzhinsky patrol ship turned out to be serviceable, which the senior sailor Musorin managed to save from the water.

The crews of the ships did everything possible to speed up the landing of troops and the unloading of military equipment. Vessels tried to get as close to the shore as possible.

The crew of a self-propelled barge under the command of foreman of the 1st article V.I. Sigov acted promptly and selflessly. Under enemy fire, the barge made several trips from the ships to the shore, delivering paratroopers, weapons, ammunition and evacuating the wounded. The foreman himself was wounded in the head and arm, but remained at his combat post until the end of the operation. For skillful and courageous actions, foreman of the 1st article Vasily Ivanovich Sigov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, and the rest of the crew were awarded orders and medals.

Despite the great efforts of the paratroopers, the pace of the landing was low due to the strong opposition of the Japanese and the limited number of landing craft.

The first echelon, consisting of the 138th Rifle Regiment (without two companies), the 1st Battalion of the 428th Howitzer Artillery Regiment, and the 169th Separate Anti-Tank Battalion (without one PTR company), landed for about two and a half hours. At the same time, the paratroopers took only small arms with them, leaving field artillery on the ships. The commander of the 138th Infantry Regiment and his staff remained on the damaged ship for a long time, so the first echelon of the landing force was virtually uncontrollable. The divisions of the regiment, instead of blocking and destroying the enemy batteries on the capes Kokutan and Kotomari, rushed into the interior of the island after the advance detachment of the landing.

Due to the loss of communications, command and control of the landing force was disrupted. This greatly hampered the effective use of naval artillery - the only real means of supporting the landing (non-flying weather did not allow air strikes on the enemy). The first contact of the coast with the ships was established only 35 minutes after the start of the landing through the surviving radio station of the senior sailor Musorin.

In this extremely difficult situation, the irresistible offensive impulse, high morale and combat qualities of the paratroopers were clearly manifested. The fighters of the first echelon continued to land directly into the water and rushed to the shore. The crews of the ships fired intensely at the enemy and at the same time extinguished fires and patched up holes.

At 9 o'clock, the landing of the second echelon of the landing began (373rd rifle regiment, marine infantry company, 279th artillery regiment without a division). It also took place with strong artillery opposition from the Japanese. In the battle for the landing, the landing force lost a patrol boat and four landing craft; eight landing craft were badly damaged.

Our aviation, in the afternoon of August 18, in groups of 8-16 aircraft, bombed and assaulted the naval bases of Kataoka and Kashiwabara in order to prevent the transfer of Japanese troops from the island of Paramushir to the island of Shumshu. However, due to bad weather, she could not help the landing directly in the battle area, where the situation was still tense.

The Japanese also used their aircraft based at the Kataoka airfield to attack our ships. However, they were not successful. Around noon on August 18, seven enemy aircraft attacked the Soviet minesweeper TShch-525, which was conducting reconnaissance at west coast Shumshu Islands. The attack did not last long. In the very first minutes of the battle, the Japanese lost two vehicles from naval artillery fire. The rest of the enemy planes withdrew from the area. In the future, they acted mainly against our unarmed ships and watercraft.

Thus, the battle for the landing, which began so successfully for the landing due to the surprise of actions achieved, subsequently took place with fierce opposition. Japanese garrison.

Fighting on the coast began at about 5 o'clock. The advance into the interior of the island without securing on the coastal sector was a tactical mistake of the forward detachment. A company of marines on the outskirts of the heavily fortified Japanese artillery positions at Cape Kotomari was stopped and went on the defensive.

At about 6 o'clock, the advance detachment approached the heights 165 and 171 dominating in the northeastern part of the island. Here he met the first strong opposition from the Japanese with artillery, mortar and machine-gun fire. Stubborn battles began for the heights, which continued throughout the day. In the fight against the paratroopers, armed only with machine guns and grenades, the enemy relied on a large number of pillboxes and bunkers. Communication with the ships had not yet been established, and therefore they could not support the forward detachment with artillery. Attempts by our fighters to suppress enemy firing points with bundles of hand grenades failed. The blocking groups created during the battle, which included sappers, operated more successfully. They managed to blow up several Japanese gun emplacements, but this could not decide the outcome of the battle for the heights.

The Japanese command, convinced that the forces of the detachment were small, soon threw an infantry battalion into the counterattack, supported by 20 tanks. By this time, the paratroopers, despite heavy enemy fire, had almost reached the peaks of both heights. The unequal fight lasted for about two hours. At the cost of heavy losses, the Japanese managed to push the advance detachment to the foot of the heights, but they themselves, having lost up to 15 tanks and up to 100 soldiers, were forced to dig in.

Soviet soldiers in this battle showed amazing courage. When the company of senior lieutenant I.V. Kashchei was blocked by an enemy pillbox, the communist foreman of the 1st article Nikolai Vilkov, without hesitation, closed his embrasure with his body. As a result, the unit was able to block and then destroy the enemy firing point. It is to him, Nikolai Vilkov, a glorious patriot of the socialist motherland, that the wonderful words said at a meeting before the landing of troops on ships belong: the Motherland and the command have entrusted us with a great, honorable task. We are going into battle to finish off the fascist beast in the East. Every person has a feeling of fear, but everyone is able to overcome it, because above all human feelings is military duty, love for the Motherland, the desire for military success. In the name of victory over the enemy, we will give our lives without hesitation.

In the name of victory over the enemy, Red Navy sailor Pyotr Ilyichev also gave his life. He, like Nikolai Vilkov, in a difficult moment of battle closed the embrasure of the enemy pillbox with his body.

The boatswain from the mother ship "Sever" foreman of the 1st class Nikolai Alexandrovich Vilkov and the helmsman from the boat "MO-253" Red Navy sailor Pyotr Ivanovich Ilyichev were posthumously awarded the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union. They are forever enrolled in the lists of the crews of the ships on which they served.

At 9 o'clock. 10 minutes. after establishing contact between the forward detachment and the ships through the radio station of the senior Red Navy soldier Musorin, artillery support ships and a battery at Cape Lopatka launched a fire raid on heights 165 and 171. Encouraged by support from the sea, the paratroopers again went on the attack. Their actions were so quick and decisive that within 10 minutes the dominant heights were taken. However, it was not possible to keep them: after a few minutes, the Japanese launched another counterattack with superior forces and again threw the landing units to the foot of the heights. From that time on, the enemy counterattacked continuously, but the forward detachment, with heroic efforts, managed to hold back the onslaught of the enemy.

The Japanese hurriedly pulled up to heights 165 and 171 forces from the depths of the island and from the island of Paramushir, and due to the low rate of landing of the main landing forces, their build-up in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe heights was slow. Only by 11 o'clock the subunits of the first echelon approached the forward detachment, and by 13 o'clock - the second. Colonel P. A. Artyushin led their actions.

The Japanese command carefully prepared another attack on the landing. At 2 pm, it launched a counterattack from the area of ​​the southwestern slopes of Hill 171 with forces of up to two battalions, supported by 18 tanks. The enemy hoped to cut the landing forces and then destroy them piece by piece. But he did not succeed. By the beginning of the counterattack, Colonel P. A. Artyushin already had sufficient intelligence information about the enemy and unraveled his plan. He concentrated on the direction of the enemy counterattack up to 100 anti-tank rifles and four 45-mm guns - everything he had. Having suffered heavy losses in men and tanks, the enemy retreated. Only one enemy tank managed to hide behind the eastern slope of Hill 171.

In this battle, senior lieutenant S. A. Savushkin skillfully directed the actions of his subordinates, who personally blew up an enemy tank with an anti-tank grenade.

The party organizer of the company of anti-tank rifles, senior sergeant Cherepanov, destroyed two tanks and damaged one. Seeing that the damaged tank continued to shoot, Cherepanov rushed under it with grenades and blew it up at the cost of his life. Junior Sergeant Georgy Balandin burned two Japanese tanks, and when his anti-tank gun failed, he rushed towards the third tank and blew it up along with him. Junior Sergeant Sultanov jumped on the armor of an enemy tank and fired point-blank at its crew through a viewing slot. Submachine gunners under the command of foreman A.P. Belov acted bravely in battle. Steadfastly repulsed the attack of enemy tanks, foreman of the 2nd article Pyotr Babich and Red Navy sailor Ivan Kobzar.

In this difficult battle, the heroes of the Pacific Ocean, Lieutenant Technician A. M. Vodynin, the Red Navy Vlasenko and Sergeant Rynda repeated the wonderful feat of five Black Sea men: with bundles of grenades they rushed under enemy tanks, and each at the cost of his own life destroyed a car. Heroically acted in battle and the commander of the vanguard of the landing force, Major P.I. settlements Shumshu Islands. Being wounded twice, he skillfully controlled the paratroopers and only after a heavy third wound was he carried away from the battlefield. A personal example of heroism was given to the sailors by the commander of the marine battalion, Major T. A. Pochtarev. He was wounded, but he continued to command the unit. For heroism and skillful leadership of the battle, P. I. Shutov and T. A. Pochtarev were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

During the reflection of the enemy counterattack, the wounded communists remained in the ranks. Their example was followed by all the soldiers of the landing. Everyone wanted to help a friend. When an enemy mine fell near the platoon commander, the wounded Red Navy soldier I. I. Volchenko covered it without hesitation. So did the sailor V.I. Tyurikov, shielding the deputy commander of the marine battalion for political affairs, Major A.P. Perm, from the fire of the Japanese sniper.

At 6 pm, supported by artillery from ships and batteries from Cape Lopatka, the landing force went on the offensive. A fierce battle broke out. By the end of the day, the landing force reached the line of the western slopes of heights 165 and 171. It held a bridgehead on the island along a front of up to 4 kilometers and a depth of up to 5-6 kilometers.

In the rear of the landing force and on the flanks of the landing site, there were still two unsuppressed strong strongholds, which made it extremely difficult to unload artillery and other military equipment.

At 8 pm on August 18, Major General A. R. Gnechko set the task for the landing force to capture the entire island. By 24 hours, specially created reinforced assault groups should have captured the enemy strongholds on Capes Kokutan and Kotomari by storm and thereby eliminate the threat to the landing force from the rear, ensure the unhindered unloading of military equipment ashore. The main landing forces were to advance in the general direction on the Kataoka naval base on the morning of August 19 and capture it by the end of the day. In this offensive, according to the plan of the commander of the operation, the field artillery unloaded during the night was supposed to participate. Artillery and air support for the offensive was assigned to the ships and the 128th air division. Aviation was preparing to deliver a bombing strike at the Kataoka naval base at night, and at dawn on the enemy’s battle formations.

The assault groups were defeated only by the morning of August 19, the strongholds on Capes Kokutan and Kotomari. The enemy offered them strong resistance. Meanwhile, the Japanese command continued to reinforce the garrison of the island, transferring troops here from Paramushir Island. By the morning of August 19, more than five infantry battalions, up to 60 tanks and 70 guns, were concentrated in front of our landing force. The enemy was preparing for a stubborn battle. But at that time, a message from the Japanese government was broadcast on the radio about unconditional surrender to the armed forces of the allies. Following this, a Japanese envoy arrived at the landing site on the island of Shumshu and handed over to the Soviet command a written statement that the units of the 91st Infantry Division "on the basis of an order from above, by 4 p.m. on August 19, cease all hostilities."

Negotiations began. The Japanese command was clearly dragging them out. Only at 18 o'clock was the act of unconditional surrender of the 91st Infantry Division, which defended the northern group of the Kuril Islands - Shumshu, Paramushir, Onekotan, signed. Based on this document, a plan was developed for the surrender of the Japanese garrisons. On the morning of August 20, our aviation was preparing to transfer one regiment to the Kataoka airfield, and the ships of the Petropavlovsk naval base were to occupy the Kataoka naval base and transfer part of the landing force to the Paramushir and Onekotan islands.

By 6 o'clock on August 20, the Okhotsk mine layer, the Kirov and Dzerzhinsky patrol ships, the TShch-525 minesweeper, the Pugachev military transport and the Polyarny hydrographic vessel headed for the Second Kuril Strait. According to a preliminary agreement with the Japanese command, on the approach to the strait, they were to be met by a Japanese pilot for further escort to Kataoka Bay. However, the pilot was not at the appointed place, and our ships followed there on their own.

Naval Base Kataoka

At 8 o'clock. 10 minutes. the ships entered the Second Kuril Strait, where they were fired upon from a variety of guns installed on the coast. Under heavy Japanese fire, the ships began to retreat, hiding behind smoke screens.

The enemy managed to cause serious damage to the Okhotsk mine layer. Minzag, covering the retreat of other ships, took the brunt of the blow from the shore. For the first time in minutes of battle, the gunners of the mine layer suppressed one of the enemy batteries. Soon "Okhotsk" was attacked by a torpedo bomber that suddenly appeared. Only a timely and skillful maneuver allowed the ship to evade the dropped torpedo, which passed three meters from the side.

From direct hits of shells on the minzag, the steering, central lighting and electric telegraph were out of order. In this difficult situation, the personnel of the "Okhotsk" acted in a coordinated manner, quickly and accurately, showing exceptional restraint and courage. Just a few seconds later, the ship switched to manual control, and emergency teams began to fight for its survivability.

Skillfully and decisively led the personnel in battle, the commander of the Okhotsk, Lieutenant Commander V. K. Moiseenko. His assistant captain-lieutenant Yu. G. Thessaloniki, commander of an artillery combat unit captain-lieutenant P. P. Trofimov, foreman of the electromechanical warhead foreman of the 1st article N. V. Shorstkin, navigational electrician foreman of the 1st article acted clearly and boldly N. N. Artamonov, the commander of the helmsman department, foreman of the 1st article Onipchenko, the machinist of the Red Navy P. N. Pecherskikh and many other sailors.

The Red Navy sailor Kolchin, wounded in the legs, arms and back by fragments of an exploding enemy shell, did not move away from his gun and continued to control the fire until the battle was over. I found the strength to fix the damaged gun and the Red Navy Kurganov wounded in both legs. Until the end of the battle, the gunner Detkin, wounded in the arm, did not leave his place at the gun.

In this battle, the daily painstaking work of the party organization of the ship, which brought up a friendly and well-coordinated team, instilled in every sailor a sense of military duty to the Motherland, fully affected. A few days before this battle, she accepted gunners Kolchin, Kurganov and Detkin as candidates for members of the Communist Party. At the party meeting, they assured the communists that they would selflessly fight the enemy. And the sailors honorably kept their word.

Thanks to the quick and skillful actions of the crews, all ships got out from under enemy fire and at 11 o'clock. 15 minutes. anchored in the First Kuril Strait.

Meanwhile, the landing troops remained in their positions awaiting the surrender of the Japanese garrison. When it became known about the insidious actions of the enemy in the Second Kuril Strait, the paratroopers were seized by a feeling of indignation. In response to the treachery of the Japanese, the landing at 13 o'clock went on the offensive. The fighting impulse of the Pacific Ocean was so great that even powerful defensive structures could not save the enemy. He was thrown back 5-6 kilometers inland. This had a sobering effect on the Japanese, and they hastened to assure our command that they would immediately cease hostilities.

The commander of the Kamchatka defensive area, Major General A. R. Gnechko, highly appreciated the actions of the sailors of the Pacific Fleet in the battle for the island of Shumshu. In a telegram addressed to the commander of the Petropavlovsk naval base, he noted: "With such glorious sailors, you can beat any enemy."

By the end of the day on August 23, over 12 thousand Japanese soldiers and officers were captured on Shumshu. Following them, they laid down their weapons and units on Paramushir. The islands to the south were occupied by amphibious assaults. On the northern islands, up to the island of Urup inclusive, the ships of the Petropavlovsk naval base landed the troops of the Kamchatka defensive region, and the Soviet units were transferred to the remaining islands from Sakhalin by the ships of the Northern Pacific Flotilla and home base Pacific Fleet.

The occupation of the islands south of Shumshu was carried out in conditions of incessant storms and thick fogs. Our navigators were not familiar with the peculiarities of navigation in the coastal waters of the Kuril Islands, replete with a large number of reefs, and the Japanese officers taken on board the ships as guides stated that they did not know these areas of the sea, and did not provide practical assistance. But, despite all these difficulties, the sailors of the Pacific Fleet successfully coped with the task assigned to them - in an extremely short time, from August 24 to September 1, 1945, they occupied the entire chain of the Kuril Islands, stretching for more than 600 miles.

For the Japanese command, such quick actions of the Soviet fleet were unexpected. All his plans to evacuate his garrisons and material assets to the islands of the metropolis were violated. It did not have time to evacuate its troops even from the island of Kunashir, separated from the island of Hokkaido by a narrow strait. At 6 o'clock on September 1, the Soviet troops landed on this island completed the liberation of the Kuril Islands.

Among the landing groups that landed in Furuka Mappu Bay was a detachment of sailors from the EK-4 frigate (frigate commander Lieutenant Commander M. L. Zvyagin). The sailors, led by engineer-captain-lieutenant Seleznev, having reached the shore, immediately rushed to the center of the military camp. On the highest building (it turned out to be a cavalry school), the commander of the helmsman's department, Sukhoyvanov, and the Red Navy man, Koshkin, hoisted the Soviet Naval flag. Meanwhile, the sailors Butakov, Urmanov, Gurov, Sedyshev, Demyanov and others were already in the barracks closest to the school. The Kunashir garrison laid down their arms. In total, 2250 soldiers and officers were captured on the island of Kunashir.

And six hours after the start of the landing, the EK-4 sailors, together with the whole country, listened to the voice of their native Moscow: the Soviet Information Bureau reported that our troops and ships of the fleet had occupied Kunashir Island and liberated all the Kuril Islands from Japanese troops. Our Motherland has regained its primordially Russian lands, which from now on serve as a reliable outpost of its Far Eastern borders on the Pacific Ocean.

The Soviet people sacredly honor the memory of their sons who gave their lives in the struggle for the liberation of the Kuril Islands. In their honor in Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky erected majestic monument. One of the inscriptions on it reads: “Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in battles for the honor and victory of our Motherland. The memory of you, who returned the Kuril Islands to the Motherland, will survive for centuries. August 1945".

Along with the landing of amphibious assault forces, the Pacific Fleet attacked enemy sea lanes. This task was solved by submarines and aircraft. It must be said that the results of the actions of the submariners were insignificant. This was mainly due to the fact that the combat zone of the Soviet fleet excluded the possibility of using our submarines in the southern part of the Sea of ​​Japan and off the coast of Japan, where enemy shipping was the busiest. Soviet boats deployed in the central part of the Sea of ​​Japan and off the coast North Korea, almost did not meet Japanese ships, since the navigation of Japanese ships actually stopped in these areas. Pacific submariners were more active in the northern part of the Sea of ​​Japan. They coped well with the tasks of conducting reconnaissance on the outskirts of South Sakhalin and the island of Hokkaido, and "L-12" under the command of Lieutenant Commander P. Z. Shchegantsev on August 22 sank Japanese armed transport in 5950 tons.

Naval aviation fought quite successfully against enemy shipping. In the first two days of hostilities alone, she made 551 sorties, destroyed and damaged over 30 ships with a total tonnage of 130 thousand tons.

The Pacific Fleet also carried out the protection of its sea lanes of communication. During the war with Japan, its warships and aircraft provided escort for 28 convoys, numbering 69 transports. At the same time, military transportation occupied a significant place: three rifle divisions and one artillery regiment were transferred from Vladivostok to the port of Maoka, and one artillery regiment from De-Kastri to Aleksandrovsk-on-Sakhalin.

The Pacific Fleet successfully coped with all the tasks assigned to it. Its personnel in battles with the enemy showed excellent combat skills, high morale and combat qualities, selfless devotion to their people and the Communist Party.

The homeland highly appreciated the feat of the Pacific. More than 30,000 sailors were awarded combat government awards. The medal "For the victory over Japan" was awarded to 170 thousand people. Fifty-two sailors were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for special distinction in battles. Among them are Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union N. G. Kuznetsov, Admiral I. S. Yumashev, Major General V. P. Trushin, Captain 1st Rank D. G. Ponomarev, Colonel M. V. Bartashov, Captains 3rd Rank M. G. Bespalov, K. V. Kazachinsky, G. V. Terpovsky, Major M. P. Barabolko, lieutenant commander M. G. Malik, senior lieutenants V. N. Leonov (was awarded the second Gold Star of the Hero), I. M. Yarotsky, sergeant K. P. Biryulya, sailors V. G. Moisesenko, P. I. Ilyichev and others.

19 ships, units and formations of the fleet were converted into guards, 16 were awarded the Order of the Red Banner, 13 received honorary titles.

With their heroic deeds in the battles for the Soviet Motherland, the Pacific peoples have written bright pages in the annals of the military glory of our valiant Armed Forces.

Admiral of the Fleet of the USSR N.G. Kuznetsov Admiral I.S. Yumashev

memorial in Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky