Ashuluk polygon. Radar station "Nebo-UE". This three-coordinate radar has no foreign analogues. Photo: Georgy DANILOV Improving the federal system of reconnaissance and airspace control: history, reality, prospects
At the end of the 20th century, the issue of creating a single radar field of the country was quite acute. Multi-departmental radar systems and means, often duplicating each other and eating up colossal budget funds, did not meet the requirements of the country's leadership and the Armed Forces. The need to expand work in this area was obvious.

The ending. Beginning at No. 2 for 2012

At the same time, due to limited spatial and functional capabilities, the current FSR and KVP do not provide a sufficient level of integration of departmental radar systems and are unable to perform the entire scope of the tasks assigned to it.

The limitations and shortcomings of the created FSR and KVP can be summarized as follows:
SITV UTs EU ATM with air defense controls are not deployed throughout the country, but only in the Central, Eastern and partially North-Western and Caucasian-Ural zones of responsibility for air defense (56% of the required for full-scale deployment of the FSR and KVP);
less than 40% of the RLP DN of the Ministry of Transport of Russia were modernized in order to perform dual-use functions, while the RTP DN of the Ministry of Defense of Russia ceased to be backbone in the unified radar system of the FSR and KVP;
information on the air situation issued by the EU ATM CA and RLP DN in terms of spatial, qualitative and probabilistic-temporal characteristics often does not meet the modern requirements of air defense control bodies (AKO);
radar, flight and planning information received from the EU ATM CA is used inefficiently in solving air defense (ASD) tasks due to the low level of equipment of the air defense CP (ASD) with adapted automation systems;
joint automated processing of data from various sources of information of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and EU ATM is not provided, which significantly reduces the reliability of identification and identification of air objects in peacetime;
the level of equipping FSR and STOP facilities with high-speed digital means and communication and data transmission systems does not meet modern requirements for the efficiency and reliability of the exchange of radar, flight and planned information;
there are shortcomings in the implementation of a unified technical policy in the creation, production, supply and operation of dual-use facilities used in the FSR and KVP;
insufficiently effective coordination of measures for the technical equipment of facilities allocated to the FSR and STOC, within the framework of various FTPs, including modernization of the EU ATM and improvement of control and communication systems of the RF Armed Forces;
existing regulatory legal documents do not fully reflect the issues of using SITV, RTP DN of the Ministry of Defense of Russia, involved in the radar support of EU ATM centers, as well as the use of means of state identification of the EU GRLO installed on the RLP DN of the Ministry of Transport of Russia;
the possibilities of zonal interdepartmental commissions for the use and KVP for coordinating the activities of the territorial bodies of the Ministry of Transport of Russia and the Ministry of Defense of Russia on the use and operation of technical means of the FSR and KVP in areas of responsibility for air defense are practically not realized.

Mobile altimeter type PRV-13
Photo: Georgy DANILOV

To eliminate these shortcomings and realize the national interests of the Russian Federation in the field of use and STOL, full-scale deployment of FSR and STOL in all regions of Russia, further integration with the EU ATM based on the use of basic information technologies for surveillance and STOL, modernized and promising means of radar, automation and communication primarily dual purpose.

The strategic goal of the development of the FSR and STOL is to ensure the required effectiveness of reconnaissance and STOL in the interests of solving the tasks of air defense (aerospace defense), protecting the state border of the Russian Federation in the airspace, suppressing terrorist acts and other illegal actions in the airspace, ensuring air traffic safety based on the integrated use radar systems and means of the Ministry of Defense of Russia and the Ministry of Transport of Russia in the context of a reduction in the total composition of forces, means and resources.

In the weekly "Military-Industrial Courier" (No. 5 dated 02/08/2012), the commander of the aerospace defense forces, Lieutenant-General Oleg Ostapenko, drew the public's attention that the current state of the low-altitude radar field within the Russian Federation has not the best configuration.

Therefore, customers and performers are full of enthusiasm and find mutually acceptable solutions in the most difficult situations and the casuistry of modern legislation in the interests of implementing the FTP.

Based on the results of Phase II of the FTP, a significant increase in the efficiency and quality of solving the problems of air defense, protection of the state border in the airspace, radar support for aviation flights and the organization of air traffic in important air directions should be ensured with a limited composition of forces, means and resources of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.

In accordance with the aerospace defense concept for the period up to 2016 and beyond, approved by the President of the Russian Federation in April 2006, one of the main directions in building the aerospace defense is currently the full-scale deployment of the FSR and the CVP throughout the country.

To ensure the full integration of departmental radar systems of the Ministry of Defense of Russia and the Ministry of Transport of Russia and the formation on this basis of a single information space on the state of the air situation as one of the main areas of concentration of efforts in building the country's aerospace defense, it is advisable to further develop the FSR and KVP in the following stages:
Stage III - short term (2011-2015);
Stage IV - medium term (2016–2020);
Stage V - long-term perspective (after 2020).

The main task of the development of the FSR and CVP in the short term is the deployment of the FSR and CVP in all regions of Russia. At the same time, during this period, it is necessary to carry out a comprehensive modernization of the EA radar in order to increase the efficiency of using radar, flight and planning information received from the EU ATM authorities of the Ministry of Transport of Russia to solve air defense (VKO) tasks and increase the area of ​​controlled airspace.

Radar station 22ZH6 "Desna"
Photo: Georgy DANILOV

To create a radar field with improved parameters, a decision was required to continue work within the framework of the FTP “Improvement of the FSR and KVP (2007–2010)” for the period until 2015. The matter necessary for the country's defense capability was not “chattered” in the authorities, as is often the case , it received a logical continuation - the FTP was extended until 2015 in accordance with the Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation of February 2011 No. 98.

The main task of the development of the FSR and KVP for the medium term (after 2016) and the long term (after 2020) is the creation of a promising integrated dual-use radar system (IRLS DN) of the FSR and KVP in the interests of forming a single information space on the state of the air situation for authorities Air Defense Command (VKO) and EU ATM.

For the timely completion of the full-scale deployment of the FSR and KVP, it is necessary, first of all, not to miss the issues of the organizational and technical plan:
creation of a permanent interdepartmental working group of representatives of interested ministries and departments, scientific organizations and industrial enterprises under the MVK IVP and KVP in order to promptly resolve problematic issues and prepare proposals on current issues;
preparation of proposals for the formation of a profile department in the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, as well as the formation of a new 136 KNO FSR and KVP Air Force to coordinate work to improve the federal system by the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.

Implementation of the concept in the period up to 2016 should allow:
to carry out a full-scale deployment of the FSR and KVP based on the creation of fragments of the EA radar in all regions of the country and thereby provide the prerequisites for the deployment of an aerospace attack reconnaissance and warning system;
improve the quality of solving the problems of ensuring national security, defense capability and the economy of the state in the field of use and KVP of the Russian Federation;
bring regulatory legal documents in the field of use and control of airspace in line with the current legislation of the Russian Federation, taking into account the reform of the RF Armed Forces, the creation and development of the Air Navigation System (ANS) of Russia;
to ensure the implementation of a unified technical policy in the development, production, deployment, operation and use of dual-use systems and means in the field of use and KVP;
create conditions for the accelerated development of domestic science and technology in the field of exploration and STG;
to reduce the total costs of the state for the maintenance and development of radar systems of the Ministry of Defense of Russia and the Ministry of Transport of Russia.

In addition, the implementation of the concept in the period up to 2016 will ensure compliance with ICAO requirements for the level of air traffic safety (according to the disaster risk criterion).

In the short term (until 2016), it is advisable to carry out priority activities for the development of the FSR and CVP, in addition to the work within the framework of the FTP “Improvement of the FSR and CVP (2007–2015)”, as well as scientific and technical support for FTP events, it is advisable to carry out in the following areas :
R&D commissioned by the Russian Ministry of Defense, aimed at conducting advanced systematic research on the modernization and development of the FSR and KVP;
R & D commissioned by the Russian Ministry of Defense, aimed at the practical implementation of the main provisions of this concept in two main areas: the comprehensive modernization of the EA radar and the creation of the head section of a promising DN IRLS;
serial deliveries of new equipment, including dual-use equipment, to FSR and KVP facilities that are part of the RF Armed Forces.

FTP "Modernization of EU ATM (2009-2015)".

With such a distribution of activities for each area of ​​work, the fulfillment of its specific, but interconnected with other tasks, is ensured, and duplication between them is excluded. In addition, it seems necessary to also organize:
introduction of new means and technologies for identifying and identifying air objects, taking into account modern conditions for airspace control in peacetime;
improving the interspecific interaction of systems for monitoring and controlling air and surface space based on the use of over-the-horizon radar (OZH radar), automatic dependent surveillance systems (ADS) and promising sources of information;
introduction of integrated digital communication systems based on advanced telecommunication technologies for prompt and sustainable exchange of information between objects.

Solving the problem of automatic remote communication of key information for the equipment for determining nationality by the hardware-software method through the available communication channels intended for issuing radar information.

The implementation of the concept in the medium and long term (after 2016) will allow:
achieve the strategic goal of the development of the FSR and STOL - to ensure the required effectiveness of intelligence and STOL in the interests of solving the problems of air defense (aerospace defense), protecting the state border of the Russian Federation in the airspace, suppressing terrorist acts and other illegal actions in the airspace, as well as the required level of air traffic safety in the face of a reduction in the total composition of forces, means and resources;
create IRLS DN and form on its basis a single information space on the state of the air situation in the interests of the Russian Ministry of Defense, the Russian Ministry of Transport and other ministries and departments;
ensure the introduction of promising means and technologies for identifying HE and automatically identifying the degree of their danger;
significantly reduce the cost of operating surveillance equipment and dual-purpose STOL due to their operation in automatic mode.

The implementation of the concept will also contribute to the integration of the Russian ANS into the Eurasian and global air navigation systems.

The goal of the development of the FSR and KVP after the completion of the main stages of development, it seems, can be the creation of a promising radar DN on the basis of the EA radar, which ensures the integration of departmental radar systems of the Ministry of Defense of Russia and the Ministry of Transport of Russia and the formation on this basis of a single information space on the state of the air situation in the interests of the Ministry of Defense Russia, the Ministry of Transport of Russia and other ministries and departments.

The creation of IRLS DN will eliminate departmental and systemic contradictions through the introduction of basic information technologies for surveillance and STOL, the use of modernized and promising means of radar, automation and communications, primarily dual-use, as well as the implementation of a unified technical policy in the field of use and STOL.

A prospective IRLS DN should include:
a network of unified sources of dual-use information (UII DN) that provides the acquisition, preliminary processing and issuance of information about the air situation in accordance with the requirements of consumers of various departments;
a network of territorial centers for joint processing of information (TCS) on the air situation;
integrated digital telecommunications network (ICTS).

The main consumers of information provided by the IRLS DN are the Air Defense Command (VKO) and the EU ATM CA.

IRLS DN should be built on a network principle, which will provide access for any consumer of information to any DD DN or TC SOI (subject to restrictions on access rights).

The composition of the technical means of all IIM DN should be unified and include the following information, processing and communication components (modules):
primary radars (PRL);
secondary radars (SRL) that provide information from the aircraft in all operating modes of request-response;
ground-based radar means of state identification of the EU GRLO (NRZ);
receiving devices of the ADS system;
devices for automatic processing and combining information from the above sources;
terminal devices for interfacing with an integrated digital telecommunications network in order to provide various types of communication (data, speech, video, etc.).

Means of obtaining information about the air situation (PRL, VRL, NRZ, ADS) can be integrated in various ways.

IIM DN should be created on the basis of valid dual-use information elements of three types:
RTP DN of the Russian Ministry of Defense (RF Armed Forces);
RTP DN of the Ministry of Defense of Russia (RF Armed Forces), solving the tasks of STOL and ensuring flights (flights) of aviation in peacetime;
RLP DN of the Ministry of Transport of Russia (EU ATM).

At the same time, in the period 2016-2020. the head section of the IRLS DN should be created in one of the regions of Russia, and subsequently the deployment of the IRLS DN in all regions of the country should be ensured. It is advisable to define the most developed fragment of the federal system in the north-west of the country as the head section of the IRLS DN.

Within the framework of the head section of the GU IRLS DN, it is necessary to use the existing systems and means of the EA radar, which provide information and technical interaction between the air defense control bodies (VKO) and the EU ATM CA, as well as deploy promising means of radar, automation and communication that implement new surveillance and STOL technologies and providing the construction of UII DN and TC SDI.

Of course, it is highly desirable that the plans be carried out. But the question naturally arises: how effective is the system of reconnaissance and airspace control as a subsystem of reconnaissance and warning of an aerospace attack of the Russian aerospace defense system?

It makes no sense today to restore the airspace radar control system that the mighty USSR once had. Air defense means of the modern level should ensure the solution of the assigned combat missions without the "foreground" advanced to the limit. As a last resort, highly mobile means of long-range radar detection and control should work.

In his article on national security issues, published on February 20, 2012 in Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Vladimir Putin drew attention to the fact that in modern conditions our country cannot rely only on diplomatic and economic methods of removing contradictions and resolving conflicts.

Russia is faced with the task of developing its military potential within the framework of a deterrence strategy and at the level of defense sufficiency. The Armed Forces, special services and other power structures must be prepared to quickly and effectively respond to new challenges. This is a necessary condition for Russia to feel safe and for our country's arguments to be accepted by partners in various international formats.

The joint efforts of the Ministry of Defense of Russia, the Ministry of Transport of Russia and the military-industrial complex to improve the FSR and KVP will significantly increase the spatial and information capabilities of the aerospace defense and the air force.

Already today, the operational-strategic commands formed throughout the country can and should make the most efficient use of the spatial potential of the unified FSR and KVP radar system. But do they actually use and how do they improve the methods of combat operations of active combat arms, having such a system?

Do the exercises work out the actions of the air defense duty forces aimed at suppressing airspace violations in those regions where today, through the reconstruction of the TRLP DN of the Ministry of Transport of Russia and the reconstruction of the centers of the EU ATM of the Ministry of Transport of Russia, equipping them with SITV with air defense control bodies, the information capabilities of the information lost in 1990s radar field? Have the issues of determining the nationality of air objects on the principle of "friend or foe" been resolved?

Probably, the widest circles of the Russian public and the expert community of the country would be interested to know how effectively the created unified radar system of the FSR and KVP works within the current boundaries of responsibility for air defense. We should not be tormented today and in the historically foreseeable future by the question: is Russia threatened by radar blindness?
Sergei Vasilievich SERGEEV
Deputy General Director - Head of the Special Design Bureau of OAO NPO LEMZ
Alexander Evgenievich KISLUKHA
Candidate of Technical Sciences, Advisor for FSR and KVP of the Deputy General Director - Head of the Special Design Bureau of OAO NPO LEMZ, Colonel

MILITARY THOUGHT No. 3(5-6)/1997

On some problems of control over compliance with the procedure for the use of airspace

Colonel GeneralV.F.MIGUNOV,

candidate of military sciences

Colonel A.A. GORYACHEV

The STATE has full and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace over its territory and territorial waters. The use of the airspace of the Russian Federation is regulated by laws consistent with international standards, as well as legal documents of the Government and individual departments within their competence.

To organize the rational use of the country's airspace, control air traffic, ensure flight safety, monitor compliance with the procedure for its use, the Unified Air Traffic Control System (EU ATC) was created. Formations and units of the Air Defense Forces, as users of airspace, are part of the control objects of this system and are guided in their activities by uniform regulatory documents for all. At the same time, readiness to repel a sudden attack by an air enemy is ensured not only by the continuous study by the crews of the command posts of the Air Defense Forces of the developing situation, but also by the exercise of control over the procedure for using airspace. The question is legitimate: is there any duplication of functions here?

Historically, in our country, the radar systems of the EU ATC and Air Defense Forces arose and developed to a large extent independently of one another. Among the reasons for this are the differences in the needs of defense and the national economy, the volume of their financing, the significant size of the territory, departmental disunity.

Air traffic data in the ATC system is used to develop commands transmitted to aircraft and ensure their safe flight along a pre-planned route. In the air defense system, they serve to detect aircraft that have violated the state border, control troops (forces) intended to destroy an air enemy, direct weapons of destruction and electronic warfare at air targets.

Therefore, the principles of construction of these systems, and hence their capabilities, differ significantly. It is essential that the positions of the EU ATC radar facilities are located along the airways and in the areas of airfields, creating a control field with a lower boundary height of about 3000 m. Air defense radio engineering units are located primarily along the state border, and the lower edge of the radar field they create does not exceed the minimum height flight of aircraft of a potential enemy.

The system of control of the Air Defense Forces over the procedure for using airspace took shape in the 1960s. Its base is made up of radio-technical air defense troops, intelligence and information centers (RIC) of the command posts of formations, associations and the Central Command Post of the Air Defense Forces. In the process of control, the following tasks are solved: providing command posts of air defense units, formations and formations with data on the air situation in their areas of responsibility; timely detection of aircraft whose ownership has not been established, as well as foreign aircraft violating the state border; identification of aircraft that violate the procedure for using airspace; ensuring the safety of air defense aviation flights; assistance to EU ATC authorities in assisting aircraft in force majeure circumstances, as well as search and rescue services.

Monitoring the use of airspace is carried out on the basis of radar and air traffic control: radar consists in escorting aircraft, establishing their nationality and other characteristics with the help of radar facilities; control room - in determining the estimated location of aircraft on the basis of the plan (applications for flights, traffic schedules) and reports of actual flights, . coming to the command posts of the Air Defense Forces from the EU ATC and departmental control points in accordance with the requirements of the Regulations on the procedure for the use of airspace.

If radar and air traffic control data are available for the aircraft, they are identified, i.e. an unambiguous relationship is established between the information obtained by an instrumental method (coordinates, movement parameters, radar identification data) and the information contained in the notice of the flight of a given object (flight or application number, tail number, starting, intermediate and final points of the route, etc.) . If it was not possible to identify the radar information with the planning and dispatching information, then the detected aircraft is classified as a violator of the procedure for using the airspace, data about it are immediately transmitted to the interacting ATC unit and measures adequate to the situation are taken. In the absence of communication with the intruder or when the aircraft commander does not follow the instructions of the controller, air defense fighters intercept him and escort him to the designated airfield.

Among the problems that have the strongest impact on the quality of the functioning of the control system, one should first of all name the insufficient development of the legal framework governing the use of airspace. Thus, the process of determining the status of Russia's border with Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in the airspace and the procedure for controlling its crossing was unjustifiably dragged out. As a result of the uncertainty that has arisen, the clarification of the ownership of an aircraft flying from the indicated states ends when it is already in the depths of the territory of Russia. At the same time, in accordance with the current instructions, part of the air defense duty forces is put on alert No. 1, additional forces and means are included in the work, i.e. material resources are being unjustifiably spent and excessive psychological tension is created among combat crew members, which is fraught with the most serious consequences. Partially, this problem is solved as a result of the organization of joint combat duty with the air defense forces of Belarus and Kazakhstan. However, its complete solution is possible only by replacing the current Regulation on the Procedure for the Use of Airspace with a new one that takes into account the current situation.

Since the beginning of the 1990s, the conditions for fulfilling the task of monitoring the procedure for using airspace have been steadily deteriorating. This is due to a reduction in the number of radio engineering troops and, as a result, the number of units, and in the first place, those of them were disbanded, the maintenance and maintenance of combat duty of which required large material costs. But it was these units, located on the sea coast, on the islands, hills and mountains, that had the greatest tactical significance. In addition, the insufficient level of material support has led to the fact that the remaining units are much more likely than before to lose their combat effectiveness due to the lack of fuel, spare parts, etc. As a result, the ability of the RTV to carry out radar control at low altitudes along the borders of Russia has significantly decreased.

In recent years, the number of airfields (landing sites) that have a direct connection with the command posts of the Air Defense Forces closest to them has noticeably decreased. Therefore, messages about actual flights are received via bypass communication channels with large delays or are not received at all, which sharply reduces the reliability of dispatch control, makes it difficult to identify radar and planned dispatch information, and does not allow the effective use of automation tools.

Additional problems arose in connection with the formation of numerous aviation enterprises and the emergence of aviation equipment in the private ownership of individuals. There are known facts when flights are carried out not only without notification of the Air Defense Forces, but also without the permission of the ATC. At the regional level, there is a disunity of enterprises in the use of airspace. The commercialization of the activities of airlines affects even the presentation of aircraft schedules. A typical situation has become when they demand their payment, and the troops do not have the means for these purposes. The problem is solved by making unofficial extracts that are not updated in a timely manner. Naturally, the quality of control over compliance with the established procedure for the use of airspace is declining.

Changes in the structure of air traffic had a certain impact on the quality of the control system. At present, there is a trend towards an increase in international flights and out-of-schedule flights, and, consequently, the congestion of the corresponding communication lines. If we take into account that the main terminal device of the communication channels at the air defense command post are outdated telegraph devices, it becomes obvious why the number of errors in receiving notices of planned flights, messages about departures, etc. has sharply increased.

It is assumed that the listed problems will be partially resolved as the Federal Airspace Reconnaissance and Control System develops, and especially during the transition to the Unified Automated Radar System (EARLS). As a result of the integration of departmental radar systems, for the first time it will be possible to use a common air traffic information model by all bodies connected to the EARLS as consumers of air situation data, including command posts of the Air Defense Forces, Air Defense of the Ground Forces, Air Force, Navy, EU ATC centers, and others departmental air traffic control points.

In the process of theoretical study of options for the use of EARLS, the question arose of the advisability of further entrusting the Air Defense Forces with the task of monitoring the procedure for using airspace. After all, the EU ATC authorities will have the same information about the air situation as the crews of the command posts of the Air Defense Forces, and at first glance, it is enough to control only the forces of the EU ATC centers, which, having direct contact with aircraft, are able to quickly understand the situation. In this case, there is no need to transfer to the command posts of the Air Defense Forces a large amount of planning and dispatching information and further identification of radar information and calculated data on the location of aircraft.

However, the Air Defense Forces, being on guard of the air borders of the state, in the matter of identifying aircraft that violate the state border, cannot rely solely on the EU ATC. The parallel solution of this task at the command posts of the Air Defense Forces and at the EU ATC centers minimizes the probability of error and ensures the stability of the control system during the transition from a peaceful situation to a military one.

There is another argument in favor of maintaining the existing order for the long term: the disciplinary influence of the control system of the Air Defense Forces on the EU ATC bodies. The fact is that the daily flight plan is monitored not only by the zonal EU ATC center, but also by the calculation of the control group of the corresponding command post of the Air Defense Forces. This also applies to many other issues related to aircraft flights. Such an organization contributes to the prompt detection of violations of the procedure for the use of airspace and their timely elimination. It is difficult to quantify the impact of the control system of the Air Defense Forces on flight safety, but practice shows a direct relationship between the reliability of control and the level of safety.

In the process of reforming the Armed Forces, objectively, there is a danger of destroying previously created and well-established systems. The problems discussed in the article are very specific, but they are closely related to such major state tasks as border protection and air traffic management, which will be relevant in the foreseeable future. Therefore, maintaining the combat readiness of the radio engineering troops, which form the basis of the Federal System for Intelligence and Control of Airspace, should be a problem not only for the Air Defense Forces, but also for other interested departments.

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BC/ NW 2015 № 2 (27): 13 . 2

AIRSPACE CONTROL THROUGH SPACE

Klimov F.N., Kochev M. Yu., Garkin E.V., Lunkov A.P.

High-precision air attack weapons, such as cruise missiles and unmanned attack aircraft, in the process of their development began to have a long range of 1,500 to 5,000 kilometers. The low visibility of such targets during the flight requires their detection and identification on the acceleration trajectory. It is possible to fix such a target at a long distance, either by over-the-horizon radar stations (OG radars), or using satellite-based radar or optical systems.

Attack drones and cruise missiles fly most often at speeds close to those of passenger aircraft, therefore, an attack by such means can be disguised as normal air traffic. This puts before the airspace control systems the task of detecting and identifying such means of attack from the moment of launch and at the maximum distance from the lines of effective destruction of them by means of VKS. To solve this problem, it is necessary to apply all existing and developed airspace control and surveillance systems, including over-the-horizon radars and satellite constellations.

The launch of a cruise missile or an attack unmanned aircraft can be carried out from the torpedo tube of a patrol boat, from the external suspension of the aircraft or from a launcher disguised as a standard sea container located on a civilian dry cargo ship, car trailer, railway platform. The satellites of the missile attack warning system already today record and track the coordinates of launches of unmanned aircraft or cruise missiles in the mountains and in the ocean using the engine torch in the acceleration section. Consequently, the satellites of the missile attack warning system need to monitor not only the territory of a potential enemy, but also the waters of the oceans and continents globally.

The placement of radar systems on satellites to control the aerospace space today is associated with technological and financial difficulties. But in modern conditions, such a new technology as broadcast automatic dependent surveillance (ADS-B) can be used to control the airspace via satellites. Information from commercial aircraft using the ADS-B system can be collected using satellites by placing on board receivers operating at ADS-B frequencies and repeaters of the received information to ground airspace control centers. Thus, it is possible to create a global field of electronic surveillance of the planet's airspace. Satellite constellations can become sources of flight information about aircraft in fairly large areas.

Information about the airspace coming from the ADS-B system receivers located on satellites makes it possible to control aircraft over the oceans and in the folds of the mountain ranges of the continents. This information will allow us to isolate the means of air attack from the flow of commercial aircraft with their subsequent identification.

ADS-B identification information on commercial aircraft coming through satellites will create an opportunity to reduce the risks of terrorist attacks and sabotage in our time. In addition, such information will make it possible to detect emergency aircraft and aviation accident sites in the ocean far from the coast.

Let us evaluate the possibility of using various satellite systems for receiving aircraft flight information using the ADS-B system and relaying this information to ground-based airspace control systems. Modern aircraft transmit flight information using the ADS-B system using on-board transponders with a power of 20 W at a frequency of 1090 MHz.

The ADS-B system operates at frequencies that freely penetrate the Earth's ionosphere. The transmitters of the ADS-B system located on board the aircraft have limited power, therefore, the receivers located on board the satellites must have sufficient sensitivity.

Using the energy calculation of the Samolet-Sputnik satellite communication line, we can estimate the maximum range at which the satellite can receive information from aircraft. The peculiarity of the used satellite line is the restrictions on the weight, overall dimensions and power consumption of both the onboard transponder of the aircraft and the onboard satellite repeater.

To determine the maximum range at which it is possible to receive messages by the ADS-B satellite, we will use the well-known equation for the line of satellite communication systems on the ground-satellite section:

where

is the effective signal power at the transmitter output ;

is the effective signal power at the receiver input;

– transmitting antenna gain;

– slant range from the spacecraft to the receiving AP;

-wavelength on the line "DOWN"

waves on the "Down" line;

is the effective aperture area of ​​the transmitting antenna;

is the transmission coefficient of the waveguide path between the transmitter and the SC antenna;

– efficiency of the waveguide path between the receiver and the ES antenna;

Transforming the formula, we find the slant range at which the satellite can receive flight information:

d = .

We substitute in the formula the parameters corresponding to the standard onboard transponder and the receiving trunk of the satellite. As calculations show, the maximum transmission range on the aircraft-satellite link is 2256 km. Such a slant transmission range on the aircraft-to-satellite link is possible only when operating through low-orbit constellations of satellites. At the same time, we use standard aircraft equipment without complicating the requirements for commercial aircraft.

The ground station for receiving information has significantly smaller restrictions on weight and dimensions than the onboard equipment of satellites and aircraft. Such a station can be equipped with more sensitive receivers and high gain antennas. Therefore, the communication range on the satellite-to-ground link depends only on the conditions of the line of sight of the satellite.

Using data from the orbits of satellite constellations, we can estimate the maximum slant range of communication between a satellite and a ground receiving station using the formula:

,

where H is the height of the satellite orbit;

is the radius of the Earth's surface.

The results of calculations of the maximum slant range for points at different geographical latitudes are presented in Table 1.

		Orbcom	Iridium	Messenger	globalstar	Signal
Orbit height, km				1400	1414	1500
Earth radius north pole, km	6356,86	2994,51	3244,24	4445,13	4469,52	4617,42
Radius of the Earth Arctic Circle, km	6365,53	2996,45	3246,33	4447,86	4472,26	4620,24
Earth radius 80°, km	6360,56	2995,34	3245,13	4446,30	4470,69	4618,62
Radius of the Earth 70°, km	6364,15	2996,14	3245,99	4447,43	4471,82	4619,79
Earth radius 60°, km	6367,53	2996,90	3246,81	4448,49	4472,89	4620,89
Earth radius 50°, km	6370,57	2997,58	3247,54	4449,45	4473,85	4621,87
Earth radius 40°, km	6383,87	3000,55	3250,73	4453,63	4478,06	4626,19
Earth radius 30°, km	6375,34	2998,64	3248,68	4450,95	4475,36	4623,42
Earth radius 20°, km	6376,91	2998,99	3249,06	4451,44	4475,86	4623,93
Earth radius 10°, km	6377,87	2999,21	3249,29	4451,75	4476,16	4624,24
Earth radius equator, km	6378,2	2999,28	3249,37	4451,85	4476,26	4624,35

The maximum transmission range on the aircraft-to-satellite link is less than the maximum slant range on the satellite-to-ground link of the Orbkom, Iridium and Gonets satellite systems. The maximum data slant range is closest to the calculated maximum data transmission range for the Orbcom satellite system.

Calculations show that it is possible to create an airspace surveillance system using satellite relaying of ADS-B messages from aircraft to ground-based flight information processing centers. Such a surveillance system will increase the range of controlled space from a ground station to 4,500 kilometers without the use of inter-satellite communications, which will increase the airspace control area. By using inter-satellite communication channels, we will be able to control the airspace globally.

Fig. 1 "Airspace control using satellites"

Fig. 2 "Airspace control with inter-satellite communication"

The proposed method of airspace control allows:

Expand the coverage area of ​​the airspace control system, including the waters of the oceans and the territory of mountain ranges up to 4500 km from the receiving ground station;

When using an inter-satellite communication system, it is possible to control the airspace of the Earth globally;

Receive flight information from aircraft regardless of foreign airspace surveillance systems;

Select air objects tracked by the overhead radar according to the degree of their danger at the far detection lines.

Literature:

1. Fedosov E.A. "Half a century in aviation". M: Bustard, 2004.

2. “Satellite communications and broadcasting. Directory. Edited by L.Ya.Kantor. M: Radio and communication, 1988.

3. Andreev V.I. “Order of the Federal Air Transport Service of the Russian Federation dated October 14, 1999 No. No. 80 "On the creation and implementation of a system of broadcasting automatic dependent surveillance in the civil aviation of Russia."

4. Traskovsky A. "Moscow's aviation mission: the basic principle of safe management." "Aviapanorama". 2008. No. 4.

A reliable aerospace defense of the country is impossible without the creation of an effective system of reconnaissance and airspace control. An important place in it is occupied by a low-altitude location. The reduction of units and means of radar reconnaissance has led to the fact that over the territory of the Russian Federation today there are open sections of the state border and the country's interior. JSC NPP Kant, which is part of the Russian Technologies State Corporation, is conducting research and development to create a prototype of a multi-position spaced radar system for semi-active location in the radiation field of cellular communication systems, broadcasting and television of ground and space-based (the Rubezh complex).

Today, the greatly increased accuracy of targeting weapons systems no longer requires the massive use of air attack weapons (AOS), and the tightened requirements for electromagnetic compatibility, as well as sanitary norms and rules, do not allow in peacetime to "contaminate" the populated areas of the country with the use of microwave radiation (UHF radiation) high-potential radar stations (RLS). In accordance with the federal law "On the sanitary and epidemiological well-being of the population" dated March 30, 1999 No. 52-FZ, radiation standards have been established that are mandatory throughout Russia. The radiation power of any of the known air defense radars many times exceeds these standards. The problem is exacerbated by the high probability of using low-flying low-observable targets, which requires the compaction of the combat formations of the traditional radar fleet and the increase in the cost of maintaining a continuous low-altitude radar field (MSRLP). To create a continuous duty round-the-clock MSRLP with a height of 25 meters (the flight altitude of a cruise missile or an ultralight aircraft) along a front of only 100 kilometers, at least two radars of the KASTA-2E2 (39N6) type are required, the power consumption of each of which is 23 kW. Taking into account the average cost of electricity in 2013 prices, only the cost of maintaining this section of the MSRLP will be at least three million rubles a year. Moreover, the length of the borders of the Russian Federation is 60,900,000 kilometers.

In addition, with the outbreak of hostilities in the conditions of the active use of electronic countermeasures (REW) by the enemy, the traditional means of location on duty can be largely suppressed, since the transmitting part of the radar completely unmasks its location.

It is possible to save the expensive radar resource, increase their capabilities in peacetime and wartime, and also increase the noise immunity of the MSRLP by using semi-active location systems with an external illumination source.

For detection of air and space targets

Abroad, extensive research is being carried out on the use of third-party radiation sources in semi-active location systems. Passive radar systems that analyze TV broadcast (terrestrial and satellite), FM radio and cellular telephony, and HF radio signals reflected from targets have become one of the most popular and promising areas of study over the past 20 years. It is believed that the American corporation Lockheed Martin has achieved the greatest success here with its Silent Sentry system (“Quiet sentry”).

Own versions of passive radars are being developed by Avtec Systems, Dynetics, Cassidian, Roke Manor Research, and the French space agency ONERA. Active work on this topic is underway in China, Australia, Italy, and the UK.

Similar work to detect targets in the field of illumination of television centers was carried out at the Military Engineering Radio Engineering Academy of Air Defense (VIRTA PVO) named after Govorov. However, the weighty practical groundwork obtained more than a quarter of a century ago on the use of illumination of analog radiation sources for solving the problems of semi-active location turned out to be unclaimed.

With the development of digital broadcasting and communication technologies, the possibility of using semi-active location systems with external illumination has also appeared in Russia.

The complex of multi-position spaced radar system of semi-active location "Rubezh" being developed by JSC "NPP "Kant" is designed to detect air and space targets in the field of external illumination. Such an illumination field is distinguished by cost-effectiveness of airspace monitoring in peacetime and resistance to electronic countermeasures during war.

The presence of a large number of highly stable radiation sources (broadcasting, communications) both in space and on Earth, which form continuous electromagnetic illumination fields, makes it possible to use them as a signal source in a semi-active system for detecting various types of targets. In this case, it is not required to spend money on radiation of own radio signals. To receive signals reflected from targets, multichannel receiving modules (PM) spaced apart in the area are used, which, together with radiation sources, create a complex of semi-active location. The passive mode of operation of the "Rubezh" complex makes it possible to ensure the secrecy of these means and use the structure of the complex in wartime. Calculations show that the secrecy of a semi-active location system in terms of masking coefficient is at least 1.5-2 times higher than a radar with a traditional combined construction principle.

The use of more cost-effective means of locating the standby mode will significantly save the resource of expensive combat systems by saving the established resource spending limit. In addition to the standby mode, the proposed complex can also perform tasks in wartime conditions, when all peacetime radiation sources are disabled or turned off.

In this regard, a far-sighted decision would be to create specialized omnidirectional covert noise radiation transmitters (100-200 W), which could be thrown or installed in threatened directions (in sectors) in order to create a field of third-party illumination in a special period. This will allow, on the basis of the networks of receiving modules remaining from peacetime, to create a hidden multi-position active-passive wartime system.

There are no analogues

The Rubezh complex is not an analogue of any of the known samples presented in the State Armaments Program. At the same time, the transmitting part of the complex already exists in the form of a dense network of base stations (BS) of cellular communications, terrestrial and satellite broadcasting and television transmitting centers. Therefore, the central task for "Kant" was the creation of receiving modules for signals reflected from targets of third-party illumination and a signal processing system (software and algorithmic support that implements systems for detecting, processing reflected signals and combating penetrating signals).

The current state of the electronic component base, data transmission and synchronization systems makes it possible to create compact receiving modules with small overall dimensions. Such modules can be located on cellular towers, using the power lines of this system and not having any effect on its operation due to their insignificant power consumption.

Sufficiently high probabilistic detection characteristics make it possible to use this tool as an unattended, automatic system for establishing the fact of crossing (flying) a certain boundary (for example, the state border) by a low-altitude target, followed by the issuance of preliminary target designation to specialized ground or space-based means about the direction and boundary of the intruder's appearance.

So, calculations show that the illumination field of base stations with a spacing between the BS of 35 kilometers and a radiation power of 100 W is capable of detecting low-altitude aerodynamic targets with an RCS of 1m2 in the "clear zone" with a correct detection probability of 0.7 and a false alarm probability of 10-4 . The number of tracked targets is determined by the performance of computing facilities. The main characteristics of the system were tested by a series of practical experiments on the detection of low-altitude targets, conducted by OAO NPP Kant with the assistance of OAO RTI im. Academician A.L. Mints "and the participation of employees of the G.K. Zhukov VA VKO. The test results confirmed the prospects of using low-altitude semi-active target location systems in the illumination field of the BS of GSM cellular communication systems. When the receiving module is removed at a distance of 1.3- 2.6 kilometers from the BS with a radiation power of 40 W, a Yak-52 type target was confidently detected under various observation angles both in the front and rear hemispheres in the first resolution element.

The configuration of the existing cellular communication network makes it possible to build a flexible pre-field for monitoring low-altitude air and surface space in the field of illumination of the BS of the GSM communication network in the border zone.

The system is proposed to be built in several detection lines to a depth of 50-100 kilometers, along the front in a band of 200-300 kilometers and in height up to 1500 meters. Each detection line represents a sequential chain of detection zones located between the BSs. The detection zone is formed by a single-base diversity (bistatic) Doppler radar. This fundamental solution is based on the fact that when a target is detected through the light, its effective reflective surface increases many times, which makes it possible to detect low-profile targets made using the Stealth technology.

Increasing the capacity of aerospace defense

From line to line of detection, the number and direction of flying targets are clarified. In this case, the algorithmic (calculated) determination of the distance to the target and its height becomes possible. The number of simultaneously registered targets is determined by the bandwidth of the information transmission channels over the lines of cellular communication networks.

Information from each detection zone is sent via GSM networks to the Information Collection and Processing Center (CSOI), which can be located many hundreds of kilometers from the detection system. Targets are identified by direction-finding, frequency and time features, as well as when installing video recorders - by target images.

Thus, the Rubezh complex will allow:

• create a continuous low-altitude radar field with multiple multi-frequency overlapping of radiation zones created by various illumination sources;
• to provide air and ground space control with the state border poorly equipped with traditional radar equipment and other territories of the country (the lower border of the controlled radar field of less than 300 meters is created only around the control centers of large airports. Over the rest of the territory of the Russian Federation, the lower border is determined only by the needs of escorting civil aircraft along the main airlines , which do not fall below 5000 meters);
• significantly reduce the cost of placement and commissioning compared to any similar systems;
• solve problems in the interests of almost all law enforcement agencies of the Russian Federation: MO (building up a low-altitude radar field on duty in threatened directions), FSO (in terms of ensuring the security of state protection facilities - the complex can be located in suburban and urban areas to monitor air terrorist threats or control the use of surface space ), ATC (control over the flights of light aircraft and unmanned vehicles at low altitudes, including air taxis - according to the forecasts of the Ministry of Transport, the annual growth of small general aviation aircraft is 20 percent annually), FSB (tasks of anti-terrorist protection of strategically important objects and protection of state borders), Ministry of Emergency Situations (fire safety monitoring, search for crashed aircraft, etc.).

The proposed means and methods for solving the tasks of low-altitude radar reconnaissance in no way cancel the means and complexes created and supplied to the RF Armed Forces, but only increase their capabilities.

Help "VPK"

For more than 28 years, the Research and Production Enterprise "Kant" has been developing, manufacturing and maintaining modern means of special communications and data transmission, radio monitoring and electronic warfare, information security systems and information channels. The products of the enterprise are used in the supply of almost all power structures of the Russian Federation and are used in solving defense and special tasks.

JSC "SPE "Kant" has a modern laboratory and production base, a highly professional team of scientists and engineering specialists, which allows it to perform a full range of scientific and production tasks: from R & D, serial production to repair and maintenance of equipment in operation.

I reported to the President that the Aerospace Forces had already received 74 new radar stations in accordance with the army and navy rearmament program adopted in 2012. This is a lot, and at first glance, the state of radar reconnaissance of the country's airspace looks good. However, serious unresolved problems remain in this area in Russia.

Effective radar reconnaissance and airspace control are indispensable conditions for ensuring the military security of any country and the safety of air traffic in the sky above it.

In Russia, the solution to this problem is entrusted to the radar of the Ministry of Defense and.

Until the early 1990s, the systems of military and civilian departments developed independently and practically self-sufficiently, which required serious financial, material and other resources.

However, the conditions for airspace control became more and more complicated due to the increasing intensity of flights, especially by foreign airlines and small aircraft, as well as due to the introduction of a notification procedure for the use of airspace and the low level of equipping civil aviation with transponders of the unified state radar identification system.

The control over flights in the “lower” airspace (zone G according to the international classification), including over megacities and especially in the Moscow zone, has become more complicated. At the same time, the activities of terrorist organizations that are capable of organizing terrorist attacks using aircraft have intensified.

The emergence of qualitatively new means of observation also has an impact on the airspace control system: new dual-purpose radars, over-the-horizon radars and automatic dependent surveillance (ADS), when, in addition to secondary radar information, parameters are transmitted directly from the aircraft’s navigation instruments from the aircraft under observation, and etc.

In order to streamline all available surveillance equipment, in 1994 it was decided to create a unified system of radar facilities of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Transport within the framework of the federal system of reconnaissance and airspace control of the Russian Federation (FSR and KVP).

The first regulatory document that laid the foundation for the creation of the FSR and KVP was the corresponding decree of 1994.

According to the document, it was an interagency dual-use system. The purpose of creating the FSR and KVP was declared to be the unification of the efforts of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Transport to effectively solve the problems of air defense and traffic control in Russian airspace.

As work progressed to create such a system from 1994 to 2006, three more presidential decrees and several government decrees were issued. This period of time was spent mainly on the creation of regulatory legal documents on the principles for the coordinated use of civil and military radars (Ministry of Defense and Rosaviatsia).

From 2007 to 2015, work on the FSR and KVP was carried out through the State Armaments Program and a separate federal target program (FTP) "Improvement of the federal system of reconnaissance and control of the airspace of the Russian Federation (2007-2015)". The head executor of work on the implementation of the FTP was approved. According to experts, the amount of funds allocated for this was at the level of the minimum allowable, but work has finally begun.

State support made it possible to overcome the negative trends of the 1990s and early 2000s to reduce the country's radar field and create several fragments of a unified automated radar system (ERLS).

Until 2015, the area of ​​airspace controlled by the Russian Armed Forces was growing steadily, while the required level of air traffic safety was maintained.

All the main activities provided for by the FTP were carried out within the established indicators, but it did not provide for the completion of work on the creation of a unified radar system (ERLS). Such a system of reconnaissance and airspace control was deployed only in certain parts of Russia.

At the initiative of the Ministry of Defense and with the support of the Federal Air Transport Agency, proposals were developed to continue the actions of the program that had been launched, but not completed, in order to fully deploy a unified system of intelligence control and airspace control over the entire territory of the country.

At the same time, the “Concept of Aerospace Defense of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2016 and beyond”, approved by the President of Russia on April 5, 2006, provides for the full-scale deployment of a unified federal system by the end of last year.

However, the corresponding FTP ended in 2015. Therefore, back in 2013, following a meeting on the implementation of the State Armament Program for 2011-2020, the President of Russia instructed the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Transport, together with and to submit proposals for amending the Federal Target Program “Improving the federal system of reconnaissance and control of the airspace of the Russian Federation (2007- 2015)" with the extension of this program until 2020.

The corresponding proposals were to be ready by November 2013, but Vladimir Putin's order was never fulfilled, and work to improve the federal system of reconnaissance and airspace control has not been funded since 2015.

The previously adopted FTP has expired, and the new one has not yet been approved.

Previously, the coordination of relevant work between the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Transport was entrusted to the Interdepartmental Commission on the Use and Control of Airspace, formed by presidential decree, which was abolished back in 2012. After the liquidation of this body, there was simply no one to analyze and develop the necessary legal framework.

Moreover, in 2015, the position of general designer was no longer in the federal system of reconnaissance and airspace control. The coordination of the bodies of the SDF and the CVP at the state level has actually ceased.

At the same time, competent experts now recognize the need to improve this system by creating a promising integrated dual-use radar (IRLS DN) and combining the FSR and KVP with an aerospace attack reconnaissance and warning system.

The new dual-purpose system should have, first of all, the advantages of a single information space, and this is possible only on the basis of solving many technical and technological problems.

The need for such measures is also evidenced by the complication of the military-political situation, and the increased threats from aerospace in modern warfare, which have already led to the creation of a new branch of the armed forces - Aerospace.

In the aerospace defense system, the requirements for the FSR and KVP will only grow.

Among them is the provision of effective continuous control in the airspace of the state border along its entire length, especially in the likely directions of attack by means of aerospace attack - in the Arctic and in the southern direction, including the Crimean peninsula.

This necessarily requires new funding for the FSR and CVP through the relevant federal target program or in another form, the re-establishment of a coordinating body between the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Transport, as well as the approval of new program documents, for example, until 2030.

Moreover, if earlier the main efforts were aimed at solving the problems of airspace control in peacetime, then in the coming period, the tasks of warning about an air attack and information support for combat operations to repel missile and air strikes will become a priority.

- military observer of Gazeta.Ru, retired colonel.
Graduated from the Minsk Higher Engineering Anti-Aircraft Missile School (1976),
Military Command Academy of Air Defense (1986).
Commander of the S-75 anti-aircraft missile division (1980-1983).
Deputy commander of an anti-aircraft missile regiment (1986-1988).
Senior officer of the main headquarters of the Air Defense Forces (1988-1992).
Officer of the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff (1992-2000).
Graduate of the Military Academy (1998).
Browser "" (2000-2003), editor-in-chief of the newspaper "Military Industrial Courier" (2010-2015).