I reported to the President that the Aerospace Forces, in accordance with the program for rearmament of the army and navy, adopted in 2012, have already received 74 new radar stations. This is a lot, and at first glance, the state of radar reconnaissance of the country's airspace looks good. However, serious unresolved problems remain in this area in Russia.

Effective radar reconnaissance and airspace control are indispensable conditions for ensuring the military security of any country and the safety of air traffic in the sky above it.

In Russia, the solution to this problem is entrusted to the radar of the Ministry of Defense and.

Until the early 1990s, the systems of military and civilian departments developed independently and practically self-sufficiently, which required serious financial, material and other resources.

However, the conditions for airspace control became more and more complicated due to the increasing intensity of flights, especially by foreign airlines and small aircraft, as well as due to the introduction of a notification procedure for the use of airspace and the low level of equipping civil aviation with transponders of the unified state radar identification system.

The control over flights in the “lower” airspace (zone G according to the international classification), including over megacities and especially in the Moscow zone, has become more complicated. At the same time, the activities of terrorist organizations that are capable of organizing terrorist attacks using aircraft have intensified.

The emergence of qualitatively new means of observation also has an impact on the airspace control system: new dual-purpose radars, over-the-horizon radars and automatic dependent surveillance (ADS), when, in addition to secondary radar information, parameters are transmitted directly from the aircraft’s navigation instruments from the aircraft under observation, and etc.

In order to streamline all available surveillance equipment, in 1994 it was decided to create a unified system of radar facilities of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Transport within the framework of the federal system of reconnaissance and airspace control of the Russian Federation (FSR and KVP).

The first regulatory document that laid the foundation for the creation of the FSR and KVP was the corresponding decree of 1994.

According to the document, it was an interagency dual-use system. The purpose of creating the FSR and the KVP was announced to unite the efforts of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Transport to effectively solve the problems of air defense and traffic control in Russian airspace.

As work progressed to create such a system from 1994 to 2006, three more presidential decrees and several government decrees were issued. This period of time was spent mainly on the creation of regulatory legal documents on the principles for the coordinated use of civil and military radars (Ministry of Defense and Rosaviatsia).

From 2007 to 2015, work on the FSR and KVP was carried out through the State Armaments Program and a separate federal target program (FTP) "Improvement of the federal system of reconnaissance and control of the airspace of the Russian Federation (2007-2015)". The head executor of work on the implementation of the FTP was approved. According to experts, the amount of funds allocated for this was at the level of the minimum allowable, but work has finally begun.

State support made it possible to overcome the negative trends of the 1990s and early 2000s to reduce the country's radar field and create several fragments of a unified automated radar system (ERLS).

Until 2015, the area of ​​airspace controlled by the Russian Armed Forces was growing steadily, while the required level of air traffic safety was maintained.

All the main activities provided for by the FTP were carried out within the established indicators, but it did not provide for the completion of work on the creation of a unified radar system (ERLS). Such a system of reconnaissance and airspace control was deployed only in certain parts of Russia.

At the initiative of the Ministry of Defense and with the support of the Federal Air Transport Agency, proposals were developed to continue the actions of the program that had been launched, but not completed, in order to fully deploy a unified system of intelligence control and airspace control over the entire territory of the country.

At the same time, the “Concept of Aerospace Defense of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2016 and beyond”, approved by the President of Russia on April 5, 2006, provides for the full-scale deployment of a unified federal system by the end of last year.

However, the corresponding FTP ended in 2015. Therefore, back in 2013, following a meeting on the implementation of the State Armaments Program for 2011-2020, the President of Russia instructed the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Transport, together with and to submit proposals for amending the Federal Target Program “Improving the federal system of reconnaissance and control of the airspace of the Russian Federation (2007- 2015)" with the extension of this program until 2020.

The corresponding proposals were to be ready by November 2013, but Vladimir Putin's order was never fulfilled, and work to improve the federal system of reconnaissance and airspace control has not been funded since 2015.

The previously adopted FTP has expired, and the new one has not yet been approved.

Previously, the coordination of relevant work between the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Transport was entrusted to the Interdepartmental Commission on the Use and Control of Airspace, formed by presidential decree, which was abolished back in 2012. After the liquidation of this body, there was simply no one to analyze and develop the necessary legal framework.

Moreover, in 2015, the position of general designer was no longer in the federal system of reconnaissance and airspace control. The coordination of the bodies of the SDF and the CVP at the state level has actually ceased.

At the same time, competent experts now recognize the need to improve this system by creating a promising integrated dual-use radar (IRLS DN) and combining the FSR and KVP with an aerospace attack reconnaissance and warning system.

The new dual-purpose system should have, first of all, the advantages of a single information space, and this is possible only on the basis of solving many technical and technological problems.

The need for such measures is also evidenced by the complication of the military-political situation, and the increased threats from aerospace in modern warfare, which have already led to the creation of a new branch of the armed forces - Aerospace.

In the aerospace defense system, the requirements for the FSR and KVP will only grow.

Among them is the provision of effective continuous control in the airspace of the state border along its entire length, especially in the likely directions of attack by means of aerospace attack - in the Arctic and in the southern direction, including the Crimean peninsula.

This necessarily requires new funding for the FSR and CVP through the relevant federal target program or in another form, the re-establishment of a coordinating body between the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Transport, as well as the approval of new program documents, for example, until 2030.

Moreover, if earlier the main efforts were aimed at solving the problems of airspace control in peacetime, then in the coming period, the tasks of warning about an air attack and information support for combat operations to repel missile and air strikes will become a priority.

- military observer of Gazeta.Ru, retired colonel.
Graduated from the Minsk Higher Engineering Anti-Aircraft Missile School (1976),
Military Command Academy of Air Defense (1986).
Commander of the S-75 anti-aircraft missile division (1980-1983).
Deputy commander of an anti-aircraft missile regiment (1986-1988).
Senior officer of the main headquarters of the Air Defense Forces (1988-1992).
Officer of the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff (1992-2000).
Graduate of the Military Academy (1998).
Browser "" (2000-2003), editor-in-chief of the newspaper "Military Industrial Courier" (2010-2015).

Primary Air Surveillance Radars (PRLS)

Radar stations serve as the main source of information about the dynamic air situation in a certain area of ​​space. They are designed to detect aircraft and determine the azimuth angles and ranges to the aircraft. PRLS irradiate all objects that fall within their field of view, and receive signals reflected by these objects. Analysis of the received signals allows obtaining all the necessary information about the movement of the aircraft. The principle of operation of the PRLS is similar to the principle of operation of a conventional pulse radar station, although it has some specific features due to the requirements, the properties of reflecting objects and the conditions of use.

Basic operational and technical characteristics (ETH)

The main ETC PRLS include the field of view, resolution, accuracy, reliability, mass-dimensional characteristics.

View area(visibility zone) -- a region of space within which the PRLS provides aircraft detection and determination of their coordinates with the required

accuracy and reliability for a given probability of correct detection and an acceptable level of false alarms. The field of view is characterized by the detection range and the solid angle within which it is reached. More precisely, the field of view is given by the detection range, considered as a function of the angular coordinates of the aircraft (azimuth and elevation) relative to the location of the radar.

Radar detection range depends on the radiation power of the radar, the directional properties of the antenna, the sensitivity of the receiver, and the reflective properties of the aircraft.

where -- r max - maximum detection range; Р Prd is the power emitted by the PRLS transmitter; G - coefficient of directivity of the antenna; l is the wavelength at which the PRLS operates; y c - effective scattering area, characterizes the reflecting properties of the reflection object; Р Prmmin - receiver sensitivity, i.e. the minimum power of the reflected signal at the input of the PRLS receiver, which, after processing in it, ensures reliable reproduction of the reflected signal on the display screen.

Expression (1) shows the maximum range of the radar in free space and shows that for a noticeable increase in range, a significant increase in R Prd, y c, G or a decrease in P Pr min and l is necessary.

However, the process of radar observation is largely influenced by the earth's surface. The signals reflected by it are summed with direct signals, which leads to interference of direct and reflected fields. In general, the power of the received reflected signals differs from the power of the received signals in free space conditions

R * Prm \u003d R Prm F 4 (c),

where - Ф (в) - interference factor.

It follows from this that the maximum range of radar observation, taking into account the influence of the earth, is determined as

r max h = r max F(v) (2).

The interference factor is a function of the elevation angle. Its maximum and minimum values ​​are equal: Ф max = 1 + с 0 ; Ф min \u003d 1 - s 0, therefore, the maximum range will depend on the elevation angle and vary from r max · (1-s 0) to r max · (1+s 0), where s 0 is the generalized reflection coefficient. This leads to the fact that the radiation pattern and the detection zone in the vertical plane have a petal character (Fig. 58).

Rice. 58. The shape of the bottom, taking into account the influence of the earth's surface

The elevation angles under which the maxima and minima of the radiation pattern are located are defined as:

sinв n min \u003d n l / 2h; sinv n max \u003d (2n + 1) l / 4h (3),

where - h is the height of the PRLS antenna suspension; l - wavelength; n = 0,1,2,3,....

It follows that the elevation angle of the first minimum is 1 min = 0, and the first maximum is oriented at an elevation angle of 1 max = l/4h.

It can be seen from expression (3) that the higher the antenna is raised above the ground, the closer the first petal is pressed to the ground, the number of petals increases, and their width decreases.

Since the coefficient c 0 can take one of the values ​​​​within 0 ... 1, then the minimum and maximum values ​​\u200b\u200bof the interference factor Ф (в) at c 0 \u003d 1 are 0 and 2, respectively. The maximum range in directions in max can increase by 2 times compared with r max defined by expression (1). But in directions in min, the maximum range is reduced to zero. To reduce the depth of dips in the visibility zone of the radar, antennas directed in the vertical plane are used. Interference phenomena are especially pronounced in the range of meter and decimeter waves.

Taking into account the considered phenomena, the antenna radiation pattern in the vertical plane acquires a jagged multi-lobe character (Fig.).

curvature of the earth's surface limits r max line of sight r etc. The expression (2) obtained earlier can be used when r max< r пр. Если же рассчитанная по этой формуле максимальная дальность действия окажется больше, чем r пр, то r max = r пр. Attenuation of radio waves in the atmosphere can lead to a reduction in the maximum range of the radar. When used in a radar station, radio waves longer than 10 cm, even under adverse weather conditions, their attenuation in the atmosphere is insignificant. For this reason, when determining r max radar decimeter and meter ranges, attenuation can be ignored. Waves of millimeter and centimeter ranges experience noticeable attenuation, and it must be taken into account when calculating r max for radars in these ranges.

Minimum range of radar is the distance below which it is unable to detect objects. It is limited by the duration of the probing pulses f and the recovery time of the receiving path, taking into account the inertia of the antenna switch t in and is determined by the expression

r min \u003d c (f + t c) / 2.

Typically, r min can be estimated at several hundred meters. For an early warning radar, this value is not of great importance. For airfield surveillance radar and meteorological radars, this parameter is essential, and special measures are taken to reduce it.

View limits in azimuth and elevation. The boundaries of the radar field of view in terms of angular coordinates in the horizontal and vertical planes are determined by the purpose and type of the radar. Surveillance radars for various purposes, as a rule, carry out all-round visibility in the horizontal plane. In the vertical plane, the field of view of these radars is limited to a sector of several tens of degrees, and the lower boundary is located at an angle of tenths of a degree relative to the horizon. Landing radars are tasked with serving a rather limited sector of space, and the field of view of these radars is limited in angle, both in the horizontal and vertical planes, by values ​​of 10 ... 30 0 .

Radar visibility diagram. For proper operation of the radar, it is necessary to know the area of ​​​​its operation. Since the field of view is not homogeneous, its characteristic should be set not to one value of the maximum range, but to a number of values ​​for different directions in the vertical plane or different heights. For visual representation, the view area is shown graphically. The view area graph is called a visibility diagram, which divides the entire space into two areas. The area within the diagram is the part of the space in which objects are observed with a given probability of correct detection. In another region of space, which is outside the visibility diagram, objects are not detected.

For two-coordinate radars, the visibility diagram is built in the vertical plane, and in this case, the rectangular coordinate system height - slant range is most often used (Fig. 59).

In this coordinate system: - the slant range is plotted along the horizontal axis r; vertical - reduced heights H etc .

Reduced Height called the height of the object above the horizon plane (or radio horizon, if the refraction of radio waves is taken into account), drawn from the radar location point:

N pr \u003d r sinv or N pr \u003d H - r 2 / 2R e,

where R e is the equivalent radius of the Earth (R e = 8500 km).

Rice. 59. Diagram of radar visibility in a rectangular coordinate system height - range

1 - lines of equal slant ranges; 2 - diagram of visibility; 3 - lines of equal true heights; 4 - lines of equal elevation angles; 5 - lines of equal reduced heights

Lines of equal true heights in a rectangular coordinate system H pr, r will look like parabolas. Lines of equal elevation angles in have the form of straight lines passing through the origin and points with coordinates r, H etc. A feature and advantage of a rectangular coordinate system is

that the region of low elevation angles, which is of the greatest importance for a long-range radar, appears close-up. The maximum ranges at given heights are determined by the points of intersection of lines of equal heights with the visibility diagram, and the points of intersection of these lines with the horizontal axis determine the line-of-sight range r pr.

Range resolution determined by the minimum distance Dr between two objects located in the same radial direction relative to the radar, the observation of which on the indicator can be carried out separately. Range resolution depends on the duration of the probing pulse f and a number of indicator parameters:

Dr \u003d c f / 2 + d p M / L p,

where d p is the diameter of the light spot on the indicator screen; L p - the length of the scanning line; M - range sweep scale.

The first term determines the potential range resolution of the radar, which depends only on the duration of the probing pulse. The second term represents the resolution of the indicator. The ratio between the potential resolution and the resolution of the indicator in different types of radar may be different.

Resolution in azimuth determined by the minimum angle in the horizontal plane dB between directions to two objects equidistant from the radar, at which they are observed separately on the indicator

This resolution

Db \u003d I + d p M / L p r,

where H is the width of the antenna radiation pattern in the horizontal plane.

The first term on the right side of this formula determines the potential resolution of the radar in azimuth, which depends only on the width of the radiation pattern in the horizontal plane. The narrower the antenna beam, the higher the angular resolution. The second term represents the azimuth resolution of the radar display device. It is determined by the same indicator parameters as the range resolution, but additionally depends on the distance to the objects. The closer the objects are from the radar, the worse the resolution in azimuth. To achieve the highest resolution, it is necessary to choose the sweep scale so that marks from objects are observed at the end of the sweep line.

Coordinate measurement accuracy .

Distance measurement accuracy. Distance measurements are accompanied by a number of errors, which are caused by the following reasons: instability of the propagation speed of radio waves and curvature of the trajectory of their propagation in the earth's atmosphere (the errors caused by these reasons are called propagation errors); the influence of noise and other interference affecting the radar ( noise errors); imperfection of the radar as a technical device ( instrumental errors); the influence of the reflecting properties of real targets, consisting of a large number of elementary reflectors ( target errors). For radars with cathode-beam indicators as output devices, instrumental and, in some cases, noise errors are of primary importance.

To instrumental errors include errors in calibration and graduation, reading, interpolation, etc. THEY are completely determined by the design of a particular radar, many of them can only be found experimentally. Among the instrumental errors, one should single out the range reading error, which to a certain extent is determined by the operator's qualifications. In most radars, the range is determined by the indicator using range scale marks. The operator determines by eye the position of the target mark between the range marks, while the UPC of the reference

уr 0 = (0.05...0.1)r m,

where r is the distance between adjacent range scale marks.

Experience shows that the root-mean-square range measurement errors (RMS) turn out to be equal: for route radars - 0.01r, for airfield radars - 0.03r or 150 m (the larger of the indicated values). Thus, the SCP for determining the line of position using racial radars is 3.4 km at a distance of 340 km and 0.5 km at a distance of 50 km. The RPC for determining the range using airfield radars is 4.5 km at a range of 150 km and 1.5 km at a range of 50 km.

Accuracy of measurement of angular coordinates. The accuracy of determining the angular coordinates is mainly affected by instrumental errors. These include errors in the formation of the angular scan of the indicator, which are formed due to errors in the synchronous-tracking system, backlash in mechanical gearboxes, mismatch between the antenna axis and the axis of symmetry of the antenna beam, errors in the formation of azimuth marks and errors in reading the angular coordinate on the indicator.

The SCP of the azimuth reading by the indicator depends on the angular size of the object mark, which is approximately equal to the width of the APB, and on the angular interval between the azimuth marks b m, i.e.

dec 0 = (0.05…0.1).

The UPC for determining the azimuth for the route radar is 0.5 0 , for the airfield - 2 0 . The corresponding values ​​of the SCP for determining the line of position at distances of 340 km and 50 km for route radar stations will be 3.4 km and 0.5 km, for airfield ones - 6 km at a distance of 150 km and 2 km - at a distance of 50 km.

It should be noted that the accuracy of determining the location of an aircraft with the help of radar depends primarily on the distance to it and is estimated by errors, the SCP of which is of the order of several kilometers.

From the data presented, it can be seen that PRLS are inferior in accuracy to short-range navigation systems and are much less accurate than satellite radio navigation systems.

Protection of the PRLS from interference

The operation of the PRLS is significantly affected by interfering signals of various origins, called interference. In particular, in addition to useful signals reflected by the aircraft, interfering signals appear due to reflections from the underlying surface, local objects and meteorological formations, and the level of these signals is much higher than the level of the useful signal, since the objects that create them are located close to the radar station. Signals due to clutter are called passive interference. The operation of the PRLS is interfered with by the operation of third-party radars and interference of industrial and atmospheric origin. Interference of these types is called active. Noise hides a weak useful signal, or creates a background that prevents its detection and measurements. Therefore, there is a need to implement measures to protect the radar from interference.

Interference protection is based on identifying differences in the parameters of interfering signals from useful ones and separating (selecting) useful signals and interference in the interests of suppression. Let's consider the main methods of protecting the PRLS from interference.

Moving target selection(SDC) allows you to reduce the influence of reflections from the underlying surface, local objects and cloud formations. It consists in the separation of signals from the aircraft and stationary objects due to the difference in the frequencies of vibrations reflected by these objects. The difference in frequencies is due to the Doppler effect, which manifests itself in the fact that if the distance between the reflection object and the PRLS changes, then the frequency of the signal received (reflected) from such an object will differ from the frequency of the signals emitted by the PRLS. The frequency difference (Doppler shift) is proportional to the radial velocity of the reflecting object and inversely proportional to the wavelength at which the radiation is conducted

Therefore, the Doppler shift is non-zero when reflected from objects moving and having? 0, and is equal to 0 when reflected from stationary formations or objects moving along a circular trajectory relative to the radar. In this case, in the case of the approach of the aircraft< 0 и F Д >0, in the case of moving away, the sign of the Doppler shift changes to the opposite, the Doppler shift is absent when reflected from the underlying surface and is close to zero when reflected from slowly moving clouds.

The PRLS uses a pulsed radiation mode, so the Doppler shift will manifest itself in a change in the amplitude of the pulse signals obtained as a result of conversion in the special SDC equipment, which is part of the PRLS. When receiving passive interference, these signals have a constant amplitude, since F D \u003d 0 (Fig. 60, a2).

Rice. 60. Timing diagrams of processes in the SDC equipment:

a - time diagrams of reflected signals after conversion: 1 - useful signal; 2 - passive interference; b - a simplified scheme of the FCHPK; c - the shape of the useful signal at the output of the PFC

In the case when a useful signal is received, the pulse signals will have a variable amplitude, changing according to the law F D (Fig. 60, a1). An important element of the SDC equipment is the FPC filter, which should not pass passive interference pulses. This filter (Fig. 60b) consists of a delay circuit for a time equal to the pulse repetition period T and, a circuit for subtracting the SW and a full-wave rectifier - the DPD detector. The reflected pulse signals after conversion arrive at the CB directly and through the delay circuit. This means that in SW each pulse is compared in amplitude with the preceding pulse. If the filter receives pulses of constant amplitude (passive interference), then the pulses are compensated in the MW and there is no signal at its output, i.e. passive interference does not enter the indicator. If pulses with variable amplitude (useful signal) arrive at the filter, then pulses of variable amplitude are also formed at the output of the CB, since now each pulse differs in amplitude from the neighboring previous pulse. The DPD rectifier converts bipolar pulses from the CB output into pulses of the same polarity (Fig. 60, c), which are fed to the indicator and create BC marks. Thus, as a result of the operation of the SDC equipment, only useful signals reflected by moving objects should arrive at the indicator, and passive noise does not pass through the FPC filter.

The operation of the radar with the SDC has some peculiarities. The envelope of the sequence of pulses arriving at the CHP circuit has a true Doppler frequency F D only in the case when the repetition rate of the probing pulses of the PRLS F and? 2F D. Otherwise, the frequency of the pulse envelope differs from F D and is called apparent Doppler frequency F DC. Until F D? F and /2, the apparent Doppler frequency is equal to the true Doppler frequency. With a further increase in F D, the frequency F DC begins to decrease and reaches zero at F D = F and. In general

F DK = 0 always when the condition F D = n·F is fulfilled and, where n=1,2,3... This phenomenon leads to the fact that some moving targets will not be displayed on the indicator. This happens when F D \u003d n F and. In this case, F DC = 0 and moving objects create the same signals at the output of the PRLS receiver as passive interference, i.e. pulses of constant amplitude that do not pass through the PFC of the SDC circuit.

Doppler frequencies F D = n·F and correspond to some radial velocities of objects W r c = n·F·l/2, where n = 0,1,2,3, etc. These speeds are called blind, since objects with such velocities are not observed in the radar with MDC. Blind speeds can be eliminated by simultaneously operating the radar at several different pulse repetition rates or by using the variable F and, which leads to the complexity of the SDC equipment and the entire radar.

Another feature of the SDC radar is that such a station does not observe objects moving without changing the distance relative to the radar or at low rates of change in distance. In order to be able to observe such objects, the PRLS has two modes of operation: SDC and “passive”. In the “passive” mode, the SDC equipment is turned off and all reflected signals, including passive interference, are received on the indicator.

polarization selection. Suppression of passive interference reflected by atmospheric formations can be achieved by using the difference between wanted signals and interference in their polarization. To do this, the radar uses radio waves with circular and elliptical polarizations, which are created using a special device located in the antenna-feeder path. The emitted radio wave with circular polarization (Fig. 61, a) is characterized by the fact that the electric field vector E rotates with a constant angular velocity equal to the carrier frequency of the signal sch, so the end of the vector describes a circle. When such a radio wave is reflected from small particles of a spherical shape, its polarization remains circular, but with the opposite direction of rotation of the vector E neg (Fig. 61b). Such a radio wave does not pass through the polarization device and therefore passive interference created by atmospheric formations consisting of small spherical particles is not received by the radar. When radio waves with circular polarization are reflected from objects of irregular geometric shape (for example, from an aircraft), its polarization becomes elliptical (Fig. 61, c), at which the rotating vector E ref changes its value and its end describes an ellipse. A wave with this polarization passes through the polarizing device, but with attenuation, and therefore the radar receives useful signals, although the range is reduced. Polarization selection is most effective in suppressing passive noise generated by fog, rain and water clouds. Reflected noise from snow, hail, and ice clouds is attenuated to a lesser extent. Sometimes a greater effect is achieved when using radiated radio waves with elliptical polarization

PRF Selection used to combat non-synchronous interference, i.e. such impulse signals, the repetition frequency of which differs from the repetition frequency of useful signals. A repetition rate selection circuit, representing a non-synchronous noise filter, is installed between the receiver and the indicator. In this filter (Fig. 46, a), the received signals are delayed exactly for the repetition period and compared with the delayed signals. The “AND” coincidence circuit generates an output signal if the pulses arriving at its two inputs coincide in time. If signals are received, the frequency F and which is equal to the repetition frequency of the probing pulses of this radar, then delayed for a time t c = T and pulses and undelayed pulses appear at the same time and from the “AND” circuit the signals pass to the indicator (Fig. 62 ,b). Thus, the signals of this radar pass through the non-synchronous noise filter. When does the radar receive signals whose repetition period is T p? T and, then the pulses delayed for a time t c = T and the pulses will no longer coincide with the undelayed ones, and for this reason there will be no pulses at the output of the “AND” circuit (Fig. 62, c). This means that non-synchronous interference is not passed by the filter and does not affect the indicator.

Requirements for the main characteristics of the PRLS

Table 11

Table 12 shows the main characteristics of domestic surveillance radars. Comparison of the data in tables 11 and 12 allows us to conclude that the characteristics of real surveillance radars for some positions differ from those recommended. In particular, the range of PRLS operated in Russia significantly exceeds the standards adopted by ICAO. The reason for this is that the GA is forced to use PRLS samples developed for defense purposes and characterized by increased capabilities compared to civilian PRLS.

Table 12

The invention relates to the field of radar and can be used in the development of advanced radars. Achievable technical result is to increase the reliability of object detection. To do this, in the well-known method of controlling airspace, which consists in reviewing it with the help of a radar, they additionally receive the reflected energy of an external radio-electronic means (RES), determine the boundaries of the zone in which the ratio of the energy of the REF reflected by the object to noise is greater than the threshold value, and the radar signal is emitted only in those directions of the zone in which the reflected energy of the RES is detected.

The invention relates to the field of radar and can be used in the development of advanced radars. To ensure airspace control, it is necessary to detect an object with high reliability and measure its coordinates with the required accuracy. There is a known method for detecting an object using passive multiposition systems that use the irradiation of an object due to the energy of external radio electronic means (RES), such as television centers or even sources of a natural nature: lightning, the sun, some stars. Detection of an object and measurement of its coordinates in this method is carried out by receiving the energy (signals) of external sources reflected by the object at spaced points and joint processing of the received signals. The advantage of this method is that its operation does not require the expenditure of energy to irradiate the object. In addition, it is known that the effective scattering area of ​​an object with bistatic transmission radar in the zone of existence of the transmission effect is 3-4 orders of magnitude larger compared to monostatic. This means that an object can be detected when it is irradiated in transmission with a relatively low energy level of the RES. The disadvantages of the method are as follows: - to implement the method, it is necessary to have several spaced receiving positions with a communication system between them, since if there is one position, only a sign of the presence of an object can be detected, and at least three are needed to measure its coordinates; - only RES with a signal having a spectrum width sufficient to ensure the resolution of objects in range can be used; - it is impossible to ensure control of the entire space when using RES with a real energy potential, because it is impossible to provide the required ratio of the RES energy reflected by the object / noise at an arbitrary position of the object in the controlled space, since, as shown in (graphs in Fig. 3, p. 426), the transmission effect acts at diffraction angles of approximately 6 degrees. The closest technical solution is a method for monitoring airspace using radar, when a probing signal is emitted sequentially in all directions of the controlled space and, according to the signal received by the reflected object, it is detected and its coordinates are measured. As a rule, a radar with a needle-shaped antenna pattern in the S-band is used for this, for example, the RAT-31S radar (Radioelectronics abroad, 1980, 17, p. 23). The disadvantage of this method is that even with a needle beam, the energy concentration when viewing each direction is insufficient to detect an inconspicuous object, since in a short viewing period (several seconds) it is required to examine the controlled space, consisting of thousands of directions. This reduces the reliability of object detection. It can be increased by increasing the concentration of energy in the examined direction by increasing the potential of the radar. For mobile radars, this is not possible. An increase in the concentration of energy in the examined direction while maintaining energy can be achieved by reducing the number of inspection directions, which is also not possible, because shortcuts will get out of hand. The present invention is aimed at solving the problem of increasing the reliability of object detection while maintaining the energy potential of the radar. The problem is solved by reducing the number of inspection directions with the help of radar in those areas of space, when the object is located, reliable reception of the energy of external RES reflected by it is ensured. This result is achieved by the fact that in the known method of airspace control, which consists in its review with the help of a radar, according to the invention, the reflected energy of an external radio electronic means (RES) is additionally received, the boundaries of the zone are determined in which the ratio of the RES energy reflected by the object to noise is greater than the threshold value , and emit a radar signal only in those directions of the zone in which the reflected energy of the RES is detected. The essence of the invention is as follows. A specific RES with known parameters is determined, the energy of which will be used to detect an object (for example, a television, communications satellite or ground-based RES). The value of the ratio of the energy of the RES reflected by the object / noise (i.e., the signal-to-noise ratio) at the reception point is determined by the formula (LZ, formula 1, p. 425): where Q= P C /P W - signal-to-noise ratio; P T - average power of the RES transmitter; G T , G R are the gains of the transmitting and receiving antennas, respectively; - wavelength; - generalized losses; ( B , Г)) - RCS of the object for a two-position system as a function of the diffraction angles B and Г; F(,) F(,) - DN of transmitting and receiving antennas; R W - average noise power in the band of the receiving device, taking into account the detection threshold; R T , R R - distance from the RES and the receiving device to the object, respectively. For a Q value exceeding the threshold value, i.e. providing the required reliability of detection of the RES energy reflected by the object, the boundary values ​​B , Г are determined, which are taken as the boundaries of the zone, when the object is located in which the ratio of the RES energy reflected by the object / noise is greater than the threshold value. In the case of using a stable operating RES, the zone where Q exceeds the threshold value can be determined experimentally by collecting statistics when reviewing the zone simultaneously in the passive mode and using the radar. At the same time, the boundaries of the zone are determined, in which the reflected energy of the RES is detected with the required reliability by the object detected by the radar. After determining the boundaries, the zone is inspected in a passive mode using a receiving antenna in the frequency range of the selected REF in a known way (see, for example,), the radar is not used to view this zone. when detecting in a certain direction o , o entering the zone, the energy of the RES reflected by the object, they decide to detect in this direction the sign of the location of the object and emits a radar signal in this direction, in the active mode they detect the object and measure its coordinates. Thus, the number of directions surveyed by the radar will be reduced; due to this, the concentration of radar energy can be increased when examining the directions of space, which will increase the reliability of object detection. It should be noted that the energy of the external RES in the present invention is used only to detect a sign of the presence of an object, in contrast, for example, to the method described in where it is used to detect an object and measure its coordinates. This eliminates the main disadvantages of the method of using an external RES, noted in , and reduces the requirements for the radiation parameters of the RES.

Claim

A method for monitoring airspace, which consists in its review with the help of a radar, characterized in that it additionally receives the energy of an external radio-electronic means (RES) reflected by an object, determines the boundaries of the zone in which the ratio of the energy of the RES reflected by the object to noise is greater than the threshold value, and the radar signal is emitted only in those directions of the zone in which the reflected energy of the RES is detected.

Other changes related to registered inventions

Changes: The transfer of the exclusive right was registered without concluding an agreement Date and number of the state registration of the transfer of the exclusive right: 03/12/2010 / RP0000606 Patent holder: Open Joint Stock Company "Scientific Research Institute of Measuring Instruments"
Former patent holder: Federal State Unitary Enterprise "Research Institute of Measuring Instruments"

Number and year of publication of the bulletin: 30-2003

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MILITARY THOUGHT No. 3(5-6)/1997

On some problems of control over compliance with the procedure for the use of airspace

Colonel GeneralV.F.MIGUNOV,

candidate of military sciences

Colonel A.A. GORYACHEV

The STATE has full and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace over its territory and territorial waters. The use of the airspace of the Russian Federation is regulated by laws consistent with international standards, as well as legal documents of the Government and individual departments within their competence.

To organize the rational use of the country's airspace, control air traffic, ensure flight safety, monitor compliance with the procedure for its use, the Unified Air Traffic Control System (EU ATC) was created. Formations and units of the Air Defense Forces, as users of airspace, are part of the control objects of this system and are guided in their activities by uniform regulatory documents for all. At the same time, readiness to repel a sudden attack by an air enemy is ensured not only by the continuous study by the crews of the command posts of the Air Defense Forces of the developing situation, but also by the exercise of control over the procedure for using airspace. The question is legitimate: is there any duplication of functions here?

Historically, in our country, the radar systems of the EU ATC and Air Defense Forces arose and developed to a large extent independently of one another. Among the reasons for this are the differences in the needs of defense and the national economy, the volume of their financing, the significant size of the territory, departmental disunity.

Air traffic data in the ATC system is used to develop commands transmitted to aircraft and ensure their safe flight along a pre-planned route. In the air defense system, they serve to detect aircraft that have violated the state border, control troops (forces) intended to destroy an air enemy, direct weapons of destruction and electronic warfare at air targets.

Therefore, the principles of construction of these systems, and hence their capabilities, differ significantly. It is essential that the positions of the EU ATC radar facilities are located along the airways and in the areas of airfields, creating a control field with a lower boundary height of about 3000 m. Air defense radio engineering units are located primarily along the state border, and the lower edge of the radar field they create does not exceed the minimum height flight of aircraft of a potential enemy.

The system of control of the Air Defense Forces over the procedure for using airspace took shape in the 1960s. Its base is made up of radio-technical air defense troops, intelligence and information centers (RIC) of the command posts of formations, associations and the Central Command Post of the Air Defense Forces. In the process of control, the following tasks are solved: providing command posts of air defense units, formations and formations with data on the air situation in their areas of responsibility; timely detection of aircraft whose ownership has not been established, as well as foreign aircraft violating the state border; identification of aircraft that violate the procedure for using airspace; ensuring the safety of air defense aviation flights; assistance to EU ATC authorities in assisting aircraft in force majeure circumstances, as well as search and rescue services.

Monitoring the use of airspace is carried out on the basis of radar and air traffic control: radar consists in escorting aircraft, establishing their nationality and other characteristics with the help of radar facilities; control room - in determining the estimated location of aircraft on the basis of the plan (applications for flights, traffic schedules) and reports of actual flights, . coming to the command posts of the Air Defense Forces from the EU ATC and departmental control points in accordance with the requirements of the Regulations on the procedure for the use of airspace.

If radar and air traffic control data are available for the aircraft, they are identified, i.e. an unambiguous relationship is established between the information obtained by an instrumental method (coordinates, movement parameters, radar identification data) and the information contained in the notice of the flight of a given object (flight or application number, tail number, starting, intermediate and final points of the route, etc.) . If it was not possible to identify the radar information with the planning and dispatching information, then the detected aircraft is classified as a violator of the procedure for using the airspace, data about it are immediately transmitted to the interacting ATC unit and measures adequate to the situation are taken. In the absence of communication with the intruder or when the aircraft commander does not comply with the controller's instructions, air defense fighters intercept him and escort him to the designated airfield.

Among the problems that have the strongest impact on the quality of the functioning of the control system, one should first of all name the insufficient development of the legal framework governing the use of airspace. Thus, the process of determining the status of Russia's border with Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in the airspace and the procedure for controlling its crossing was unjustifiably dragged out. As a result of the uncertainty that has arisen, the clarification of the ownership of an aircraft flying from the indicated states ends when it is already in the depths of the territory of Russia. At the same time, in accordance with the current instructions, part of the air defense forces on duty is put on alert No. 1, additional forces and means are included in the work, i.e. material resources are being unjustifiably spent and excessive psychological tension is created among combat crew members, which is fraught with the most serious consequences. Partially, this problem is solved as a result of the organization of joint combat duty with the air defense forces of Belarus and Kazakhstan. However, its complete solution is possible only by replacing the current Regulation on the Procedure for the Use of Airspace with a new one that takes into account the current situation.

Since the beginning of the 1990s, the conditions for fulfilling the task of monitoring the procedure for using airspace have been steadily deteriorating. This is due to a reduction in the number of radio engineering troops and, as a result, the number of units, and in the first place, those of them were disbanded, the maintenance and maintenance of combat duty of which required large material costs. But it was these units, located on the sea coast, on the islands, hills and mountains, that had the greatest tactical significance. In addition, the insufficient level of material support has led to the fact that the remaining units are much more likely than before to lose their combat effectiveness due to the lack of fuel, spare parts, etc. As a result, the ability of the RTV to carry out radar control at low altitudes along the borders of Russia has significantly decreased.

In recent years, the number of airfields (landing sites) that have a direct connection with the command posts of the Air Defense Forces closest to them has noticeably decreased. Therefore, messages about actual flights are received via bypass communication channels with large delays or are not received at all, which sharply reduces the reliability of dispatch control, makes it difficult to identify radar and planned dispatch information, and does not allow the effective use of automation tools.

Additional problems arose in connection with the formation of numerous aviation enterprises and the emergence of aviation equipment in the private ownership of individuals. There are known facts when flights are carried out not only without notification of the Air Defense Forces, but also without the permission of the ATC. At the regional level, there is a disunity of enterprises in the use of airspace. The commercialization of the activities of airlines affects even the presentation of aircraft schedules. A typical situation has become when they demand their payment, and the troops do not have the means for these purposes. The problem is solved by making unofficial extracts that are not updated in a timely manner. Naturally, the quality of control over compliance with the established procedure for the use of airspace is declining.

Changes in the structure of air traffic had a certain impact on the quality of the control system. At present, there is a trend towards an increase in international flights and out-of-schedule flights, and, consequently, the congestion of the corresponding communication lines. If we take into account that the main terminal device of the communication channels at the air defense command post are outdated telegraph devices, it becomes obvious why the number of errors in receiving notices of planned flights, messages about departures, etc. has sharply increased.

It is assumed that the listed problems will be partially resolved as the Federal Airspace Reconnaissance and Control System develops, and especially during the transition to the Unified Automated Radar System (EARLS). As a result of the integration of departmental radar systems, for the first time it will be possible to use a common information model of air traffic by all bodies connected to the EARLS as consumers of air situation data, including command posts of the Air Defense Forces, Air Defense of the Ground Forces, Air Force, Navy, EU ATC centers, and others departmental air traffic control points.

In the process of theoretical study of options for the use of EARLS, the question arose of the advisability of further entrusting the Air Defense Forces with the task of monitoring the procedure for using airspace. After all, the EU ATC authorities will have the same information about the air situation as the crews of the command posts of the Air Defense Forces, and at first glance, it is enough to control only the forces of the EU ATC centers, which, having direct contact with aircraft, are able to quickly understand the situation. In this case, there is no need to transfer to the command posts of the Air Defense Forces a large amount of planning and dispatching information and further identification of radar information and calculated data on the location of aircraft.

However, the Air Defense Forces, being on guard of the air borders of the state, in the matter of identifying aircraft that violate the state border, cannot rely solely on the EU ATC. The parallel solution of this task at the command posts of the Air Defense Forces and at the EU ATC centers minimizes the probability of error and ensures the stability of the control system during the transition from a peaceful situation to a military one.

There is another argument in favor of maintaining the existing order for the long term: the disciplinary influence of the control system of the Air Defense Forces on the EU ATC bodies. The fact is that the daily flight plan is monitored not only by the zonal EU ATC center, but also by the calculation of the control group of the corresponding command post of the Air Defense Forces. This also applies to many other issues related to aircraft flights. Such an organization contributes to the prompt detection of violations of the procedure for the use of airspace and their timely elimination. It is difficult to quantify the impact of the control system of the Air Defense Forces on flight safety, but practice shows a direct relationship between the reliability of control and the level of safety.

In the process of reforming the Armed Forces, objectively, there is a danger of destroying the previously created and well-established systems. The problems discussed in the article are very specific, but they are closely related to such major state tasks as border protection and air traffic management, which will be relevant in the foreseeable future. Therefore, maintaining the combat readiness of the radio engineering troops, which form the basis of the Federal System for Intelligence and Control of Airspace, should be a problem not only for the Air Defense Forces, but also for other interested departments.

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of these Federal Rules

144. Control over compliance with the requirements of these Federal Rules is carried out by the Federal Air Transport Agency, air traffic services (flight control) in the zones and areas established for them.

Control over the use of the airspace of the Russian Federation in terms of identifying aircraft violating the procedure for using the airspace (hereinafter referred to as violating aircraft) and aircraft violating the rules for crossing the state border of the Russian Federation is carried out by the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.

145. If the air traffic services (flight control) body detects a violation of the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation, information about this violation is immediately brought to the attention of the air defense body and the aircraft commander, if radio contact has been established with him.

146. Air defense agencies provide radar control of the airspace and provide the relevant centers of the Unified System with data on the movement of aircraft and other material objects:

a) threatening illegal crossing or illegally crossing the state border of the Russian Federation;

b) being unidentified;

c) violating the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation (until the violation ceases);

d) transmitting a distress signal;

e) flying letters "A" and "K";

f) performing flights for search and rescue operations.

147. Violations of the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation include:

a) the use of airspace without the permission of the relevant center of the Unified System under the permitting procedure for the use of airspace, except for the cases specified in paragraph 114 of these Federal Rules;

b) non-compliance with the conditions brought by the center of the Unified System in the permit for the use of airspace;

c) non-compliance with the commands of air traffic services (flight control) and the commands of the aircraft on duty of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation;

d) non-compliance with the procedure for using the airspace of the border strip;

e) non-compliance with the established temporary and local regimes, as well as short-term restrictions;

f) flight of a group of aircraft in excess of the number specified in the flight plan of the aircraft;

g) use of the airspace of a prohibited zone, a restricted flight zone without permission;

h) landing of an aircraft at an unscheduled (undeclared) aerodrome (site), except for cases of forced landing, as well as cases agreed with the air traffic services (flight control) authority;

i) non-compliance by the aircraft crew with the rules of vertical and horizontal separation (except in cases of an emergency on board the aircraft requiring an immediate change in the profile and flight mode);

(see text in previous edition)

j) unauthorized deviation of the air traffic service (flight control) body outside the boundaries of the air route, local air line and route, except in cases where such deviation is due to flight safety considerations (bypassing dangerous meteorological weather phenomena, etc.);

k) entry of an aircraft into controlled airspace without the permission of the air traffic services (flight control) authority;

M) flight of an aircraft in class G airspace without notifying the air traffic services unit.

148. When an intruder aircraft is detected, the air defense authorities give the “Mode” signal, which means the requirement to stop violating the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation.

The air defense authorities bring the "Regime" signal to the appropriate centers of the Unified System and take action to stop the violation of the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation.

(see text in previous edition)

The centers of the Unified System warn the commander of the intruder aircraft (if there is radio communication with him) about the "Regime" signal given by the air defense authorities and assist him in stopping the violation of the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation.

(see text in previous edition)

149. The decision on the further use of the airspace of the Russian Federation, if the commander of the offending aircraft has stopped violating the procedure for its use, is taken by:

a) the head of the duty shift of the main center of the Unified System - when performing international flights along air traffic services routes;

b) chiefs of duty shifts of the regional and zonal centers of the Unified System - when performing domestic flights along air traffic service routes;

c) the operational duty officer of the air defense body - in other cases.

(see text in previous edition)

150. On the decision made in accordance with paragraph 149 of these Federal Rules, the centers of the Unified System and the air defense authorities notify each other, as well as the user of the airspace.

(see text in previous edition)

151. When illegally crossing the state border of the Russian Federation, using weapons and military equipment of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation against an intruder aircraft, as well as when unidentified aircraft and other material objects appear in the airspace, in exceptional cases, the air defense authorities give the signal "Carpet" , meaning the requirement for the immediate landing or withdrawal from the corresponding area of ​​​​all aircraft in the air, with the exception of aircraft involved in the fight against intruder aircraft and performing search and rescue tasks.

(see text in previous edition)

The air defense authorities bring the "Carpet" signal, as well as the boundaries of the area of ​​operation of the specified signal, to the corresponding centers of the Unified System.

(see text in previous edition)

The centers of the Unified System immediately take measures to withdraw aircraft (their landing) from the coverage area of ​​the "Carpet" signal.

(see text in previous edition)

152. If the crew of the offending aircraft does not comply with the command of the air traffic services (flight control) to stop violating the procedure for using the airspace, such information is immediately communicated to the air defense authorities. The air defense authorities apply measures to the intruder aircraft in accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation.

Aircraft crews are obliged to obey the commands of the aircraft on duty of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, used to stop violations of the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation.

If an intruder aircraft is forced to land, its landing is carried out at an airfield (heliport, landing site) suitable for landing this type of aircraft.

153. In the event of a threat to flight safety, including that associated with an act of unlawful interference on board an aircraft, the crew gives a distress signal. On aircraft equipped with a hazard signaling system, in the event of an attack on the crew, the "CCO" signal is additionally given. Upon receipt of the signal "Distress" and (or) "SSO" from the crew of the aircraft, the air traffic services (flight control) bodies are obliged to take the necessary measures to provide assistance to the crew in distress, and immediately transfer to the centers of the Unified System, aviation coordination centers of search and rescue, as well as to the air defense authorities, data on his whereabouts and other necessary information.

154. After clarification of the reasons for the violation of the procedure for using the airspace of the Russian Federation, permission for the further operation of an international flight or a flight associated with the crossing of more than 2 zones of the Unified System is accepted by the head of the shift on duty of the main center of the Unified System, and in other cases - the heads of shifts on duty of the zonal center of the Unified System systems.