On some problems of control over compliance with the procedure for the use of airspace. Towards a unified radar field of the country (1) Airspace control radar field article

Asia

A reliable aerospace defense of the country is impossible without the creation of an effective system of reconnaissance and airspace control. An important place in it is occupied by a low-altitude location. The reduction of units and means of radar reconnaissance has led to the fact that over the territory of the Russian Federation today there are open sections of the state border and the country's interior. JSC NPP Kant, which is part of the Russian Technologies State Corporation, is conducting research and development to create a prototype of a multi-position spaced radar system for semi-active location in the radiation field of cellular communication systems, broadcasting and television, ground-based and space-based (the Rubezh complex).

Today, the greatly increased accuracy of targeting weapons systems no longer requires the massive use of air attack weapons (AOS), and the tightened requirements for electromagnetic compatibility, as well as sanitary norms and rules, do not allow in peacetime to “contaminate” the populated areas of the country with the use of microwave radiation (UHF radiation) high-potential radar stations (RLS). In accordance with the federal law "On the sanitary and epidemiological well-being of the population" dated March 30, 1999 No. 52-FZ, radiation standards have been established that are mandatory throughout Russia. The radiation power of any of the known air defense radars many times exceeds these standards. The problem is exacerbated by the high probability of using low-flying low-observable targets, which requires the compaction of the combat formations of the traditional radar fleet and the increase in the cost of maintaining a continuous low-altitude radar field (MSRLP). To create a continuous duty round-the-clock MSRLP with a height of 25 meters (the flight altitude of a cruise missile or an ultralight aircraft) along a front of only 100 kilometers, at least two radars of the KASTA-2E2 (39N6) type are required, the power consumption of each of which is 23 kW. Taking into account the average cost of electricity in 2013 prices, only the cost of maintaining this section of the MSRLP will be at least three million rubles a year. Moreover, the length of the borders of the Russian Federation is 60,900,000 kilometers.

In addition, with the outbreak of hostilities in the conditions of the active use of electronic countermeasures (REW) by the enemy, the traditional means of location on duty can be largely suppressed, since the transmitting part of the radar completely unmasks its location.

It is possible to save the expensive radar resource, increase their capabilities in peacetime and wartime, and also increase the noise immunity of the MSRLP by using semi-active location systems with an external illumination source.

For detection of air and space targets

Abroad, extensive research is being carried out on the use of third-party radiation sources in semi-active location systems. Passive radar systems that analyze TV broadcast (terrestrial and satellite), FM radio and cellular telephony, and HF radio signals reflected from targets have become one of the most popular and promising areas of study over the past 20 years. It is believed that the American corporation Lockheed Martin has achieved the greatest success here with its Silent Sentry system (“Quiet sentry”).

Own versions of passive radars are being developed by Avtec Systems, Dynetics, Cassidian, Roke Manor Research, and the French space agency ONERA. Active work on this topic is underway in China, Australia, Italy, and the UK.

Similar work to detect targets in the field of illumination of television centers was carried out at the Military Engineering Radio Engineering Academy of Air Defense (VIRTA PVO) named after Govorov. However, the weighty practical groundwork obtained more than a quarter of a century ago on the use of illumination of analog radiation sources for solving problems of semi-active location turned out to be unclaimed.

With the development of digital broadcasting and communication technologies, the possibility of using semi-active location systems with external illumination has also appeared in Russia.

The complex of multi-position spaced radar system of semi-active location "Rubezh", being developed by JSC NPP Kant, is designed to detect air and space targets in the field of external illumination. Such a field of illumination is distinguished by the cost-effectiveness of airspace monitoring in peacetime and resistance to electronic countermeasures during war.

The presence of a large number of highly stable radiation sources (broadcasting, communications) both in space and on Earth, which form continuous electromagnetic illumination fields, makes it possible to use them as a signal source in a semi-active system for detecting various types of targets. In this case, it is not required to spend money on radiation of own radio signals. To receive signals reflected from targets, multi-channel receiving modules (PM) spaced apart on the ground are used, which, together with radiation sources, create a semi-active location complex. The passive mode of operation of the Rubezh complex makes it possible to ensure the secrecy of these funds and use the structure of the complex in wartime. Calculations show that the secrecy of a semi-active location system in terms of masking coefficient is at least 1.5–2 times higher than a radar with a traditional combined construction principle.

The use of more cost-effective means of locating the standby mode will significantly save the resource of expensive combat systems by saving the established resource spending limit. In addition to the standby mode, the proposed complex can also perform tasks in wartime conditions, when all peacetime radiation sources are disabled or turned off.

In this regard, a far-sighted decision would be to create specialized omnidirectional covert noise transmitters (100-200 W), which could be thrown or installed in threatened directions (in sectors) in order to create a field of third-party illumination in a special period. This will allow, on the basis of the networks of receiving modules remaining from peacetime, to create a hidden multi-position active-passive wartime system.

There are no analogues

The Rubezh complex is not an analogue of any of the known samples presented in the State Armaments Program. At the same time, the transmitting part of the complex already exists in the form of a dense network of base stations (BS) of cellular communications, terrestrial and satellite broadcasting and television transmitting centers. Therefore, the central task for "Kant" was the creation of receiving modules for signals reflected from targets of third-party illumination and a signal processing system (software and algorithmic support that implements systems for detecting, processing reflected signals and combating penetrating signals).

The current state of the electronic component base, data transmission and synchronization systems makes it possible to create compact receiving modules with small overall dimensions. Such modules can be located on cellular towers, using the power lines of this system and not having any effect on its operation due to their insignificant power consumption.

Sufficiently high probabilistic detection characteristics make it possible to use this tool as an unattended, automatic system for establishing the fact of crossing (flying) a certain boundary (for example, the state border) by a low-altitude target, followed by the issuance of preliminary target designation to specialized ground or space-based means about the direction and boundary of the intruder's appearance.

So, calculations show that the illumination field of base stations with a spacing between the BS of 35 kilometers and a radiation power of 100 W is capable of detecting low-altitude aerodynamic targets with an RCS of 1m2 in the "clear zone" with a correct detection probability of 0.7 and a false alarm probability of 10-4 . The number of tracked targets is determined by the performance of computing facilities. The main characteristics of the system were tested by a series of practical experiments on the detection of low-altitude targets, conducted by OAO NPP Kant with the assistance of OAO RTI im. Academician A. L. Mints ”and the participation of employees of the VA VKO them. G. K. Zhukov. The test results confirmed the prospects for the use of low-altitude semi-active target location systems in the illumination field of the BS of GSM cellular communication systems. When the receiving module was removed at a distance of 1.3–2.6 kilometers from the BS with a radiation power of 40 W, a Yak-52 type target was confidently detected under various observation angles both in the front and rear hemispheres in the first resolution element.

The configuration of the existing cellular communication network makes it possible to build a flexible pre-field for monitoring low-altitude air and surface space in the field of illumination of the BS of the GSM communication network in the border zone.

The system is proposed to be built in several detection lines to a depth of 50-100 kilometers, along the front in a band of 200-300 kilometers and in height up to 1500 meters. Each detection line represents a sequential chain of detection zones located between the BS. The detection zone is formed by a single-base diversity (bistatic) Doppler radar. This fundamental solution is based on the fact that when a target is detected through the light, its effective reflective surface increases many times, which makes it possible to detect subtle targets made using the Stealth technology.

Increasing the capacity of aerospace defense

From line to line of detection, the number and direction of flying targets are clarified. In this case, the algorithmic (calculated) determination of the distance to the target and its height becomes possible. The number of simultaneously registered targets is determined by the bandwidth of information transmission channels over the lines of cellular communication networks.

Information from each detection zone is sent via GSM networks to the Information Collection and Processing Center (CSOI), which can be located many hundreds of kilometers from the detection system. Targets are identified by direction-finding, frequency and time features, as well as when installing video recorders - by target images.

Thus, the Rubezh complex will allow:

create a continuous low-altitude radar field with multiple multi-frequency overlapping of radiation zones created by various illumination sources;
to provide air and ground space control with the state border poorly equipped with traditional radar equipment and other territories of the country (the lower border of the controlled radar field of less than 300 meters is created only around the control centers of large airports. Over the rest of the territory of the Russian Federation, the lower border is determined only by the needs of escorting civil aircraft along the main airlines , which do not fall below 5000 meters);
significantly reduce the cost of placement and commissioning compared to any similar systems;
solve problems in the interests of almost all law enforcement agencies of the Russian Federation: MO (building up a low-altitude radar field on duty in threatened directions), FSO (in terms of ensuring the security of state protection facilities - the complex can be located in suburban and urban areas to monitor air terrorist threats or control the use of surface space ), ATC (control over the flights of light aircraft and unmanned vehicles at low altitudes, including air taxis - according to the forecasts of the Ministry of Transport, the annual growth of small general aviation aircraft is 20 percent annually), FSB (tasks of anti-terrorist protection of strategically important objects and protection of state borders), Ministry of Emergency Situations (fire safety monitoring, search for crashed aircraft, etc.).

This problem can be solved by affordable, cost-effective and sanitary-safe means. Such facilities are built on the principles of semi-active radar (SAL) using the accompanying illumination of transmitters communication and broadcasting networks. Today, almost all well-known developers of radar equipment are working on the problem.

The task of creating and maintaining a continuous round-the-clock duty airspace control field at extremely low altitudes (LMA) is complex and costly. The reasons for this lie in the need to compact the orders of radar stations (RLS), the creation of an extensive communication network, the saturation of the surface space with sources of radio emissions and passive reflections, the complexity of ornithological and meteorological conditions, dense population, high intensity of use and inconsistency of legal acts relating to this area.

In addition, the boundaries of responsibility of various ministries and departments in the control of surface space are divided. All this greatly complicates the possibility of organizing radar monitoring of airspace in WWI.

Why do we need a continuous surface airspace monitoring field

For what purposes is it necessary to create a continuous field for monitoring surface airspace in WWI in peacetime? Who will be the main consumer of the information received?

The experience of working in this direction with various departments indicates that no one is against the creation of such a field, but each interested department needs (for various reasons) its own functional unit limited in goals, tasks and spatial characteristics.

The Ministry of Defense needs to control the airspace in WWI around defended objects or in certain directions. Border service - above the state border, and not higher than 10 meters from the ground. A unified air traffic management system - over airfields. Ministry of Internal Affairs - only aircraft preparing for takeoff or landing outside the permitted flight areas. FSB - the space around sensitive facilities.

Ministry of Emergency Situations - areas of man-made or natural disasters. FSO - areas of stay of protected persons.

This situation indicates the absence of a unified approach to solving the problems and threats that await us in the low-altitude surface environment.

In 2010, the problem of controlling the use of airspace in WWI was transferred from the responsibility of the state to the responsibility of the aircraft operators themselves.

In accordance with the current Federal rules for the use of airspace, a notification procedure for the use of airspace was established for flights in class G (small aviation) airspace. From now on, flights in this airspace class can be carried out without obtaining an air traffic control clearance.

If we consider this problem through the prism of the appearance of unmanned aerial vehicles in the air, and in the near future, passenger "flying motorcycles", then a whole range of tasks arises related to ensuring the safety of using airspace at extremely low altitudes above settlements, industrially hazardous areas .

Who will control traffic in low-altitude airspace?

Companies in many countries around the world are developing such affordable low-altitude vehicles. For example, the Russian company Aviaton plans to create its own passenger quadrocopter by 2020 for flights (attention!) outside airfields. That is, where it is not prohibited.

The reaction to this problem has already manifested itself in the form of the adoption by the State Duma of the law "On Amendments to the Air Code of the Russian Federation regarding the use of unmanned aircraft." In accordance with this law, all unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) weighing more than 250 g are subject to registration.

In order to register a UAV, it is necessary to submit an application to the Federal Air Transport Agency in any form, indicating the details of the drone and its owner. However, judging by how things are going with the registration of manned light and ultralight aircraft, it seems that the problems with unmanned aircraft will be the same. Now, two different organizations are responsible for registering light (ultra-light) manned and unmanned aircraft, and no one is able to organize control over the rules for their use in class G airspace over the entire territory of the country. This situation contributes to an uncontrolled increase in cases of violations of the rules for the use of low-altitude airspace and, as a result, an increase in the threat of man-made disasters and terrorist attacks.

On the other hand, the creation and maintenance of a wide field of monitoring in WWI in peacetime by traditional means of low-altitude radar is hampered by the limitations of sanitary requirements for the electromagnetic load on the population and the compatibility of RES. Existing legislation strictly regulates the RES radiation regimes, especially in populated areas. This is strictly taken into account when designing new RES.

So, what's in the bottom line? The need for surface airspace monitoring in PMA objectively remains and will only increase.

However, the possibility of its implementation is limited by the high cost of creating and maintaining a field in WWI, the inconsistency of the legal framework, the lack of a single responsible body interested in a large-scale round-the-clock field, as well as restrictions imposed by supervisory organizations.

It is urgent to start developing preventive measures of an organizational, legal and technical nature aimed at creating a system for continuous monitoring of PMA airspace.

The maximum height of the class G airspace border varies up to 300 meters in the Rostov region and up to 4.5 thousand meters in the regions of Eastern Siberia. In recent years, Russian civil aviation has seen an intensive growth in the number of registered facilities and operators of general aviation (GA). As of 2015, over 7,000 aircraft were registered in the State Register of Civil Aircraft of the Russian Federation. It should be noted that, in general, no more than 20-30% of the total number of aircraft (AC) of legal entities, public associations and private owners of aircraft using aircraft are registered in Russia. The remaining 70-80% fly without an air operator's license or without aircraft registration at all.

According to NP GLONASS estimates, sales of small unmanned aerial systems (UAS) in Russia annually increase by 5-10%, and by 2025 2.5 million of them will be purchased in the Russian Federation. It is expected that the Russian market in terms of consumer and commercial small Civilian UAS can make up about 3-5% of the global.

Monitoring: economical, affordable, environmentally friendly

If we take an unbiased approach to the means of creating a continuous monitoring of the WWI in peacetime, then this problem can be solved by affordable, cost-effective and sanitary-safe means. Such facilities are built on the principles of semi-active radar (SAL) using the accompanying illumination of transmitters of communication and broadcasting networks.

Today, almost all well-known developers of radar equipment are working on the problem. The SNS Research group has published the report "Military & Civil Aviation Passive Radar Market: 20132023" (Military & Civil Aviation Passive Radar Market: 20132023) and expects that by 2023 the volume of investment in both sectors in the development of technologies for such radars will reach more than 10 billion US dollars, with annual growth in the period 2013-2023. will be almost 36%.

The simplest version of a semi-active multi-position radar is a two-position (bistatic) radar, in which the backlight transmitter and the radar receiver are separated by a distance exceeding the range measurement error. A bistatic radar consists of a satellite illumination transmitter and a radar receiver separated by a base distance.

As an accompanying illumination, radiation from transmitters of communication and broadcasting stations, both ground-based and space-based, can be used. The backlight transmitter generates an omnidirectional low-altitude electromagnetic field, being in which targets

With a certain effective scattering surface (ESR), they reflect electromagnetic energy, including in the direction of the radar receiver. The receiver's antenna system receives a direct signal from the illumination source and an echo signal from the target, delayed relative to it.

In the presence of a directional reception antenna, the angular coordinates of the target and the total range relative to the radar receiver are measured.

The basis for the existence of PAL are extensive areas of coverage by broadcasting and communication signals. Thus, the zones of various cellular operators almost completely overlap, mutually complementing each other. In addition to the zones of cellular communication illumination, the territory of the country is covered by overlapping radiation fields of TV broadcast transmitters, VHF FM and FM satellite TV broadcasting stations, and so on.

To create a multi-position network of radar monitoring in the WWI, an extensive communication network is required. Dedicated secure APNs have such capabilities - packet data transmission channels based on M2M "telematics" technology. The typical bandwidth characteristics of such channels at peak load are no worse than 20 Kb / s, but according to the experience of application, they are almost always much higher.

JSC "SPE "KANT" is working on the study of the possibility of detecting targets in the field of illumination of cellular networks. In the course of the research, it was found that the most extensive coverage of the territory of the Russian Federation is carried out by the GSM 900 communication signal. This communication standard provides not only sufficient energy for the illumination field, but also the technology of packet data transmission GPRS wireless communication at a speed of up to 170 Kb / s between elements of a multi-position radar spaced at regional distances.

The work carried out as part of R&D showed that a typical out-of-town territorial-frequency planning of a cellular communication network makes it possible to build a low-altitude multi-position active-passive system for detecting and tracking ground and air (up to 500 meters) targets with an effective reflective surface of less than 1 sq. m.

The high suspension height of base stations on antenna towers (from 70 to 100 meters) and the network configuration of cellular communication systems make it possible to solve the problem of detecting low-altitude targets made using low-observable STELS technology using spaced location methods.

As part of R & D for the detection of air, ground and surface targets in the field of cellular networks, a detector of a passive receiving module (PRM) of a semi-active radar station was developed and tested.

As a result of field tests of the PPM mock-up within the boundaries of the GSM 900 cellular communication network with a distance between base stations of 4-5 km and a radiation power of 30-40 W, the possibility of detecting a Yak-52 aircraft and a DJI Phantom 2 quadcopter at the estimated range of flights was achieved. , moving road and river transport, as well as people.

During the tests, the spatial and energy characteristics of detection and the capabilities of the GSM signal to resolve targets were evaluated. The possibility of transmitting packet detection information and remote mapping of information from the test area to a remote observation indicator has been demonstrated.

Thus, in order to create a continuous round-the-clock multi-frequency overlapping field of location in the surface space at the WMA, it is necessary and possible to build a multi-position active-passive location system with the combination of information flows obtained using illumination sources of various wavelengths: from meter (analog TV, VHF FM and FM broadcast) to short decimeter (LTE, Wi-Fi). This requires the efforts of all organizations working in this direction. The necessary infrastructure and encouraging experimental data are available for this. We can safely say that the accumulated information base, technologies and the very principle of covert PAL will find their rightful place in wartime.

In the figure: "Scheme of a bistatic radar". For example, the current coverage area of the borders of the Southern Federal District is given by the signal of the cellular operator "Beeline"

To assess the scale of placement of backlight transmitters, let's take the average Tver region as an example. In it, on an area of 84 thousand square meters. km with a population of 1 million 471 thousand people, there are 43 broadcasting transmitters for broadcasting sound programs of VHF FM and FM stations with a radiation power of 0.1 to 4 kW; 92 analog transmitters of television stations with radiation power from 0.1 to 20 kW; 40 digital transmitters of television stations with power from 0.25 to 5 kW; 1,500 transmitting radio communication facilities of various affiliations (mainly cellular base stations) with a radiation power from a few mW in an urban area to several hundred W in a suburban area. The height of the illumination transmitters suspension varies from 50 to 270 meters.

MILITARY THOUGHT No. 3(5-6)/1997

On some problems of control over compliance with the procedure for the use of airspace

Colonel GeneralV.F.MIGUNOV,

candidate of military sciences

Colonel A.A. GORYACHEV

The STATE has full and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace over its territory and territorial waters. The use of the airspace of the Russian Federation is regulated by laws consistent with international standards, as well as legal documents of the Government and individual departments within their competence.

To organize the rational use of the country's airspace, control air traffic, ensure flight safety, monitor compliance with the procedure for its use, the Unified Air Traffic Control System (EU ATC) was created. Formations and units of the Air Defense Forces, as users of airspace, are part of the control objects of this system and are guided in their activities by uniform regulatory documents for all. At the same time, readiness to repel a sudden attack by an air enemy is ensured not only by the continuous study by the crews of the command posts of the Air Defense Forces of the developing situation, but also by the exercise of control over the procedure for using airspace. The question is legitimate: is there any duplication of functions here?

Historically, in our country, the radar systems of the EU ATC and Air Defense Forces arose and developed to a large extent independently of one another. Among the reasons for this are the differences in the needs of defense and the national economy, the volume of their financing, the significant size of the territory, departmental disunity.

Air traffic data in the ATC system is used to develop commands transmitted to aircraft and ensure their safe flight along a pre-planned route. In the air defense system, they serve to detect aircraft that have violated the state border, control troops (forces) intended to destroy an air enemy, direct weapons of destruction and electronic warfare at air targets.

Therefore, the principles of construction of these systems, and hence their capabilities, differ significantly. It is essential that the positions of the EU ATC radar facilities are located along the airways and in the areas of airfields, creating a control field with a lower boundary height of about 3000 m. Air defense radio engineering units are located primarily along the state border, and the lower edge of the radar field they create does not exceed the minimum height flight of aircraft of a potential enemy.

The system of control of the Air Defense Forces over the procedure for using airspace took shape in the 1960s. Its base is made up of radio-technical air defense troops, intelligence and information centers (RIC) of the command posts of formations, associations and the Central Command Post of the Air Defense Forces. In the process of control, the following tasks are solved: providing command posts of air defense units, formations and formations with data on the air situation in their areas of responsibility; timely detection of aircraft whose ownership has not been established, as well as foreign aircraft violating the state border; identification of aircraft that violate the procedure for using airspace; ensuring the safety of air defense aviation flights; assistance to EU ATC authorities in assisting aircraft in force majeure circumstances, as well as search and rescue services.

Monitoring the use of airspace is carried out on the basis of radar and air traffic control: radar consists in escorting aircraft, establishing their nationality and other characteristics with the help of radar facilities; control room - in determining the estimated location of aircraft on the basis of the plan (applications for flights, traffic schedules) and reports of actual flights, . coming to the command posts of the Air Defense Forces from the EU ATC and departmental control points in accordance with the requirements of the Regulations on the procedure for the use of airspace.

If radar and air traffic control data are available for the aircraft, they are identified, i.e. an unambiguous relationship is established between the information obtained by an instrumental method (coordinates, movement parameters, radar identification data) and the information contained in the notice of the flight of a given object (flight or application number, tail number, starting, intermediate and final points of the route, etc.) . If it was not possible to identify the radar information with the planning and dispatching information, then the detected aircraft is classified as a violator of the procedure for using the airspace, data about it are immediately transmitted to the interacting ATC unit and measures adequate to the situation are taken. In the absence of communication with the intruder or when the aircraft commander does not follow the instructions of the controller, air defense fighters intercept him and escort him to the designated airfield.

Among the problems that have the strongest impact on the quality of the functioning of the control system, one should first of all name the insufficient development of the legal framework governing the use of airspace. Thus, the process of determining the status of Russia's border with Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in the airspace and the procedure for controlling its crossing was unjustifiably dragged out. As a result of the uncertainty that has arisen, the clarification of the ownership of an aircraft flying from the indicated states ends when it is already in the depths of the territory of Russia. At the same time, in accordance with the current instructions, part of the air defense forces on duty is put on alert No. 1, additional forces and means are included in the work, i.e. material resources are being unjustifiably spent and excessive psychological tension is created among combat crew members, which is fraught with the most serious consequences. Partially, this problem is solved as a result of the organization of joint combat duty with the air defense forces of Belarus and Kazakhstan. However, its complete solution is possible only by replacing the current Regulation on the Procedure for the Use of Airspace with a new one that takes into account the current situation.

Since the beginning of the 1990s, the conditions for fulfilling the task of monitoring the procedure for using airspace have been steadily deteriorating. This is due to a reduction in the number of radio engineering troops and, as a result, the number of units, and in the first place, those of them were disbanded, the maintenance and maintenance of combat duty of which required large material costs. But it was these units, located on the sea coast, on the islands, hills and mountains, that had the greatest tactical significance. In addition, the insufficient level of material support has led to the fact that the remaining units are much more likely than before to lose their combat effectiveness due to the lack of fuel, spare parts, etc. As a result, the ability of the RTV to carry out radar control at low altitudes along the borders of Russia has significantly decreased.

In recent years, the number of airfields (landing sites) that have a direct connection with the nearest Air Defense Forces command posts has noticeably decreased. Therefore, messages about actual flights are received via bypass communication channels with large delays or are not received at all, which sharply reduces the reliability of dispatch control, makes it difficult to identify radar and planned dispatch information, and does not allow the effective use of automation tools.

Additional problems arose in connection with the formation of numerous aviation enterprises and the emergence of aviation equipment in the private ownership of individuals. There are known facts when flights are carried out not only without notification of the Air Defense Forces, but also without the permission of the ATC. At the regional level, there is a disunity of enterprises in the use of airspace. The commercialization of the activities of airlines affects even the presentation of aircraft schedules. A typical situation has become when they demand their payment, and the troops do not have the means for these purposes. The problem is solved by making unofficial extracts that are not updated in a timely manner. Naturally, the quality of control over compliance with the established procedure for the use of airspace is declining.

Changes in the structure of air traffic had a certain impact on the quality of the control system. At present, there is a trend towards an increase in international flights and out-of-schedule flights, and, consequently, the congestion of the corresponding communication lines. If we take into account that the main terminal device of the communication channels at the air defense command post are outdated telegraph devices, it becomes obvious why the number of errors in receiving notices of planned flights, messages about departures, etc. has sharply increased.

It is assumed that the listed problems will be partially resolved as the Federal Airspace Reconnaissance and Control System develops, and especially during the transition to the Unified Automated Radar System (EARLS). As a result of the integration of departmental radar systems, for the first time it will be possible to use a common information model of air traffic by all bodies connected to the EARLS as consumers of air situation data, including command posts of the Air Defense Forces, Air Defense of the Ground Forces, Air Force, Navy, EU ATC centers, and others departmental air traffic control points.

In the process of theoretical study of options for the use of EARLS, the question arose of the advisability of further entrusting the Air Defense Forces with the task of monitoring the procedure for using airspace. After all, the EU ATC authorities will have the same information about the air situation as the crews of the command posts of the Air Defense Forces, and at first glance, it is enough to control only the forces of the EU ATC centers, which, having direct contact with aircraft, are able to quickly understand the situation. In this case, there is no need to transfer to the command posts of the Air Defense Forces a large amount of planning and dispatching information and further identification of radar information and calculated data on the location of aircraft.

However, the Air Defense Forces, being on guard of the air borders of the state, in the matter of identifying aircraft that violate the state border, cannot rely solely on the EU ATC. The parallel solution of this task at the command posts of the Air Defense Forces and at the EU ATC centers minimizes the probability of error and ensures the stability of the control system during the transition from a peaceful situation to a military one.

There is another argument in favor of maintaining the existing order for the long term: the disciplinary influence of the control system of the Air Defense Forces on the EU ATC bodies. The fact is that the daily flight plan is monitored not only by the zonal EU ATC center, but also by the calculation of the control group of the corresponding command post of the Air Defense Forces. This also applies to many other issues related to aircraft flights. Such an organization contributes to the prompt detection of violations of the procedure for the use of airspace and their timely elimination. It is difficult to quantify the impact of the control system of the Air Defense Forces on flight safety, but practice shows a direct relationship between the reliability of control and the level of safety.

In the process of reforming the Armed Forces, objectively, there is a danger of destroying previously created and well-established systems. The problems discussed in the article are very specific, but they are closely related to such major state tasks as border protection and air traffic management, which will be relevant in the foreseeable future. Therefore, maintaining the combat readiness of the radio engineering troops, which form the basis of the Federal System for Intelligence and Control of Airspace, should be a problem not only for the Air Defense Forces, but also for other interested departments.

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Today, the greatly increased accuracy of targeting weapons systems no longer requires the massive use of air attack weapons (AOS), and the tightened requirements for electromagnetic compatibility, as well as sanitary norms and rules, do not allow in peacetime to "contaminate" the populated areas of the country with the use of microwave radiation (UHF radiation) high-potential radar stations (RLS). In accordance with the federal law "On the sanitary and epidemiological well-being of the population" dated March 30, 1999 No. 52-FZ, radiation standards have been established that are mandatory throughout Russia. The radiation power of any of the known air defense radars many times exceeds these standards. The problem is exacerbated by the high probability of using low-flying low-observable targets, which requires the compaction of the combat formations of the traditional radar fleet and the increase in the cost of maintaining a continuous low-altitude radar field (MSRLP). To create a continuous duty round-the-clock MSRLP with a height of 25 meters (the flight altitude of a cruise missile or an ultralight aircraft) along a front of only 100 kilometers, at least two radars of the KASTA-2E2 (39N6) type are required, the power consumption of each of which is 23 kW. Taking into account the average cost of electricity in 2013 prices, only the cost of maintaining this section of the MSRLP will be at least three million rubles a year. Moreover, the length of the borders of the Russian Federation is 60,900,000 kilometers.

For detection of air and space targets

With the development of digital broadcasting and communication technologies, the possibility of using semi-active location systems with external illumination has also appeared in Russia.

The complex of multi-position spaced radar system of semi-active location "Rubezh" being developed by JSC "NPP "Kant" is designed to detect air and space targets in the field of external illumination. Such an illumination field is distinguished by cost-effectiveness of airspace monitoring in peacetime and resistance to electronic countermeasures during war.

The presence of a large number of highly stable radiation sources (broadcasting, communications) both in space and on Earth, which form continuous electromagnetic illumination fields, makes it possible to use them as a signal source in a semi-active system for detecting various types of targets. In this case, it is not required to spend money on radiation of own radio signals. To receive signals reflected from targets, multi-channel receiving modules (PM) spaced apart on the ground are used, which, together with radiation sources, create a semi-active location complex. The passive mode of operation of the "Rubezh" complex makes it possible to ensure the secrecy of these funds and use the structure of the complex in wartime. Calculations show that the secrecy of a semi-active location system in terms of masking coefficient is at least 1.5-2 times higher than a radar with a traditional combined construction principle.

In this regard, a far-sighted decision would be to create specialized omnidirectional covert noise radiation transmitters (100-200 W), which could be thrown or installed in threatened directions (in sectors) in order to create a field of third-party illumination in a special period. This will allow, on the basis of the networks of receiving modules remaining from peacetime, to create a hidden multi-position active-passive wartime system.

There are no analogues

So, calculations show that the illumination field of base stations with a spacing between the BS of 35 kilometers and a radiation power of 100 W is capable of detecting low-altitude aerodynamic targets with an RCS of 1m2 in the "clear zone" with a correct detection probability of 0.7 and a false alarm probability of 10-4 . The number of tracked targets is determined by the performance of computing facilities. The main characteristics of the system were tested by a series of practical experiments on the detection of low-altitude targets, conducted by OAO NPP Kant with the assistance of OAO RTI im. Academician A.L. Mints "and the participation of employees of the G.K. Zhukov VA VKO. The test results confirmed the prospects of using low-altitude semi-active target location systems in the illumination field of the BS of GSM cellular communication systems. When the receiving module is removed at a distance of 1.3- 2.6 kilometers from the BS with a radiation power of 40 W, a Yak-52 type target was confidently detected under various observation angles both in the front and rear hemispheres in the first resolution element.

Increasing the capacity of aerospace defense

Information from each detection zone is sent via GSM networks to the Information Collection and Processing Center (CSOI), which can be located many hundreds of kilometers from the detection system. Identification of targets is carried out by direction finding, frequency and time features, as well as when installing video recorders - by the image of targets.

Thus, the Rubezh complex will allow:

create a continuous low-altitude radar field with multiple multi-frequency overlapping of radiation zones created by various illumination sources;
to provide air and ground space control with the state border poorly equipped with traditional radar equipment and other territories of the country (the lower border of the controlled radar field of less than 300 meters is created only around the control centers of large airports. Over the rest of the territory of the Russian Federation, the lower border is determined only by the needs of escorting civil aircraft along the main airlines , which do not fall below 5000 meters);
significantly reduce the cost of placement and commissioning compared to any similar systems;
solve problems in the interests of almost all law enforcement agencies of the Russian Federation: MO (building up a low-altitude radar field on duty in threatened directions), FSO (in terms of ensuring the security of state protection facilities - the complex can be located in suburban and urban areas to monitor air terrorist threats or control the use of surface space ), ATC (control over the flights of light aircraft and unmanned vehicles at low altitudes, including air taxis - according to the forecasts of the Ministry of Transport, the annual growth of small general aviation aircraft is 20 percent annually), FSB (tasks of anti-terrorist protection of strategically important objects and protection of state borders), Ministry of Emergency Situations (fire safety monitoring, search for crashed aircraft, etc.).

The proposed means and methods for solving the tasks of low-altitude radar reconnaissance in no way cancel the means and complexes created and supplied to the RF Armed Forces, but only increase their capabilities.

Help "VPK"

For more than 28 years, the Research and Production Enterprise "Kant" has been developing, manufacturing and maintaining modern means of special communications and data transmission, radio monitoring and electronic warfare, information security systems and information channels. The products of the enterprise are used in the supply of almost all power structures of the Russian Federation and are used in solving defense and special tasks.

JSC "SPE "Kant" has a modern laboratory and production base, a highly professional team of scientists and engineering specialists, which allows it to perform a full range of scientific and production tasks: from R & D, serial production to repair and maintenance of equipment in operation.

Impossible without the creation of an effective system of reconnaissance and airspace control. An important place in it is occupied by a low-altitude location. The reduction of units and means of radar reconnaissance has led to the fact that over the territory of Russia today there are open sections of the state border and the country's interior.

JSC NPP Kant, which is part of the Russian Technologies State Corporation, is conducting research and development to create a prototype of a multi-position diversity radar system for semi-active location in the radiation field of cellular communication systems, broadcasting and television, ground-based and space-based ( complex "Rubezh").

In accordance with the federal law "On the sanitary and epidemiological well-being of the population" dated March 30, 1999 No. 52-FZ, radiation standards have been established that are mandatory throughout Russia. The radiation power of any of the known air defense radars many times exceeds these standards. The problem is exacerbated by the high probability of using low-flying low-observable targets, which requires the compaction of the combat formations of the traditional radar fleet and the increase in the cost of maintaining a continuous low-altitude radar field (MSRLP).

To create a continuous duty round-the-clock MSRLP with a height of 25 meters (the flight altitude of a cruise missile or an ultralight aircraft) along a front of only 100 kilometers, at least two radars of the KASTA-2E2 (39N6) type are required, the power consumption of each of which is 23 kW. Taking into account the average cost of electricity in 2013 prices, only the cost of maintaining this section of the MSRLP will be at least 3 million rubles per year. Moreover, the length of the borders of the Russian Federation is 60,900,000 kilometers.

For detection of air and space targets

Similar work on target detection in the field of illumination of television centers was carried out at the Military Engineering Radio Engineering Academy of Air Defense (VIRTA PVO) named after. Govorova. However, the weighty practical groundwork obtained more than a quarter of a century ago on the use of illumination of analog radiation sources for solving problems of semi-active location turned out to be unclaimed.

With the development of digital broadcasting and communication technologies, the possibility of using semi-active location systems with external illumination has also appeared in Russia.

Developed by OAO NPP Kant complex of multi-position spaced radar system of semi-active location "Rubezh" designed to detect air and space targets in the field of external illumination. Such a field of illumination is distinguished by the cost-effectiveness of airspace monitoring in peacetime and resistance to electronic countermeasures during war.

The passive mode of operation of the Rubezh complex makes it possible to ensure the secrecy of these funds and use the structure of the complex in wartime. Calculations show that the secrecy of a semi-active location system in terms of masking coefficient is at least 1.5–2 times higher than a radar with a traditional combined construction principle.

There are no analogues of the Rubezh complex

The main characteristics of the system were tested by a series of practical experiments on the detection of low-altitude targets, conducted by OAO NPP Kant with the assistance of OAO RTI im. Academician A.L. Mints "and the participation of employees of the VA VKO them. G.K. Zhukov. The test results confirmed the prospects for the use of low-altitude semi-active target location systems in the illumination field of the BS of GSM cellular communication systems.

When the receiving module was removed at a distance of 1.3–2.6 kilometers from the BS with a radiation power of 40 W, a Yak-52 type target was confidently detected under various observation angles both in the front and rear hemispheres in the first resolution element.

The configuration of the existing cellular communication network makes it possible to build a flexible pre-field for monitoring low-altitude air and surface space in the field of illumination of the BS of the GSM communication network in the border zone.

The system is proposed to be built in several detection lines to a depth of 50-100 km, along the front in a band of 200-300 km and in height up to 1500 meters.

Each detection line represents a sequential chain of detection zones located between the BS. The detection zone is formed by a single-base diversity (bistatic) Doppler radar. This fundamental solution is based on the fact that when a target is detected through the light, its effective reflective surface increases many times, which makes it possible to detect subtle targets made using the Stealth technology.

Increasing the capacity of aerospace defense

Thus, complex "Rubezh" will allow:

1. create a continuous low-altitude radar field with multiple multi-frequency overlapping of radiation zones created by various illumination sources;

2. to provide the state border and other territories of the country, poorly equipped with traditional means of radar, with means of controlling the air and ground space (the lower boundary of the controlled radar field of less than 300 meters is created only around the control centers of large airports. Over the rest of the territory of the Russian Federation, the lower boundary is determined only by the needs of escorting civil aircraft along the main airlines that do not go below 5000 meters);

3. Significantly reduce deployment and commissioning costs compared to any similar systems;

4. solve problems in the interests of almost all law enforcement agencies of the Russian Federation:

- MO (building up a low-altitude radar field on duty in threatened directions);

- FSO (in terms of ensuring the security of state protection facilities - the complex can be located in suburban and urban areas to monitor air terrorist threats or control the use of surface space);

- ATC (control over the flights of light aircraft and unmanned vehicles at low altitudes, including air taxis - according to the forecasts of the Ministry of Transport, the annual increase in general-purpose small aircraft is 20% annually);

- FSB (tasks of anti-terrorist protection of strategically important facilities and protection of the state border);

— Ministry of Emergency Situations (fire safety monitoring, search for crashed aircraft, etc.).

The proposed means and methods for solving the problems of low-altitude radar reconnaissance in no way cancel the means and complexes created and supplied to the Russian Armed Forces, but only increase their capabilities.

/Andrey Demidyuk, Doctor of Military Sciences, Associate Professor;
Evgeniy Demidyuk, candidate of technical sciences, vpk-news.ru/